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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 20 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 57-92
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
An extension rule assigns to each fractional tournament x (specifying, for every pair of social alternatives a and b, the proportion xab of voters who prefer a to b) a random choice function y (specifying a collective choice probability distribution for each subset of alternatives), which chooses a from a,b with probability xab. There exist multiple neutral and stochastically rationalizable extension rules. Both linearity (requiring that y be an affine function of x) and independence of irrelevant comparisons (asking that the probability distribution on a subset of alternatives depend only on the restriction of the fractional tournament to that subset) are incompatible with very weak properties implied by stochastic rationalizability. We identify a class of maximal domains, which we call sequentially binary, guaranteeing that every fractional tournament arising from a population of voters with preferences in such a domain has a unique admissible stochastically rationalizable extension.
Schlagwörter: 
fractional tournament
random choice
stochastic rationalizability
Voting
JEL: 
D70
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