Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320280 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 20 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 27-56
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In contrast, too much condescension leads to worse outcomes, as does anti-condescension.
Subjects: 
Social learning
JEL: 
D830
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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