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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1581-1618
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, independence conditions, and constraints on social evaluation. We prove a welfarism theorem for these domains and characterize the social welfare functions that satisfy the axioms of extensive measurement at both individual and social levels. The main results are simple axiomatizations of strong dictatorship in the Arrovian framework and classical utilitarianism in the generalized framework.
Schlagwörter: 
Arrow's impossibility theorem
classical utilitarianism
measurement theory
Social welfare functions
variable-population ethics
JEL: 
D63
D71
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