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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1261-1304
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a model of large many-to-one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our model generalizes Greinecker and Kah (2021), which focuses on one-to-one matching and did not allow for occupational choice. Applications include the roommate problem with non-atomic participants, explaining the size and distribution of firms and wage inequality.
Schlagwörter: 
ccupational choice
stability
complementarity
externalities
large economy
JEL: 
C78
D47
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