Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320263 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1151-1184
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
A principal provides incentives for independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that an anti-informativeness principle holds: very generally, robustly optimal contracts must link the incentive pay of the agents. In symmetric and binary environments, they must exhibit joint performance evaluation - each agent's pay is increasing in the performance of the other.
Subjects: 
Moral hazard
robustness
teams
JEL: 
D81
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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