Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320255 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 865-915
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's value is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of an infinite-horizon, mechanism-selection game. Despite being able to choose mechanisms, the seller can do no better and no worse than if he chose prices in each period, so that he is subject to Coase's conjecture. Our analysis marries insights from information and mechanism design with those from the literature on durable goods. We do so by relying on the revelation principle in Doval and Skreta (2022).
Subjects: 
Coase conjecture
information design
limited commitment
Mechanism design
posted prices
public PBE
JEL: 
D84
D86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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