Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320249 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 635-666
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy-proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in practice. We model school choice under incomplete information and show that EDA is regret-free truth-telling, which is a weaker incentive property than strategy-proofness and was introduced by Fernandez (2020). We also show that there is no efficient matching rule that weakly Pareto dominates a stable matching rule and is regret-free truth-telling. Note that the original version of EDA by Kesten (2010) weakly Pareto dominates a stable matching rule, but it is not efficient.
Subjects: 
efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance
manipulation
matching
regret
School choice
stable-dominating
JEL: 
C78
D81
D82
I20
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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