Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320118 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11897
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We present a self- and social-signaling model formalizing findings in political psychology that moral and political judgments stem primarily from intuition and emotion, while reasoning serves to rationalize these intuitions to maintain an image of impartiality. In social interactions, agents' rationalizations are strategic complements: others' rationalizations weaken their ability to judge critically and make their actions less revealing of (inconvenient) truths. When agents are naive about their own rationalizations, our model predicts ideological and affective polarization, with each side assigning inappropriate motives to the other. Cross-partisan exchanges of narratives reduce polarization but are avoided by the agents. In within-group exchanges agents favor skilled speakers, whose narratives worsen polarization. Our model explains partisan disagreements over policy consequences, aligns with empirical polarization trends, and offers insights into efforts to disrupt echo chambers.
Subjects: 
esteem
moral behavior
self-deception
group decisions
polarization
JEL: 
D72
D83
D91
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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