Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319262 
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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies [ISSN:] 1468-5965 [Volume:] 63 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 467-484
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
The European Union's (EU's) response to the pandemic has been accompanied by reconfigurations in its institutional hierarchy, affecting the sites where institutional reforms are prepared and implemented. Whereas the Eurogroup drove reform during the euro crisis, the Commission had a more pronounced role in the development and implementation of pandemic instruments. This article ties in with failing‐forward arguments that view European integration as cyclical, arguing that this cyclicality also concerns the institutional dynamics in European economic governance. Based on expert interviews, official documents and reports, the analysis reconstructs and compares the institutional configurations during the euro crisis and the pandemic. Its findings suggest three modifications to ‘failing forward’: first, incomplete intergovernmental decisions are often the result of dominant particular interests rather than ‘lowest common denominator’ solutions; second, supranational bodies can exploit the delegitimization of intergovernmental solutions; and third, ad hoc measures can prolong the failing‐forward cycle and displace lasting integration steps.
Schlagwörter: 
Economic and Monetary Union
economic governance
euro crisis
European integration
Recovery and Resilience Facility
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