Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316912 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11798
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We study the fiscal determinants of the French Revolution, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the salt tax - a large source of royal revenues and one of the most extractive forms of taxation of the Ancien Régime. Implementing a Regression Discontinuity design (RDD), we find that parts of France subject to a higher salt tax experienced more revolts against the monarchy between 1750 and 1789. These effects already appear in the 1760s, but become stronger over time and peak in the 1780s. Combining the RD model with variation in local weather conditions during the 1780s, we document that droughts amplify the effects of the salt tax on revolts by increasing wheat prices and activating latent discontent. Then, we connect the discontent generated by the salt tax to the French Revolution. First, we provide evidence that riots spread across space through a process of contagion that is stronger in high tax areas. Second, we show that areas burdened by a higher salt tax report more complaints against the salt tax in the list of grievances collected by the king in the spring of 1789. Third, we document that legislators representing areas with a higher salt tax are more likely to demand the end of the monarchy and to support the death penalty for the king.
Subjects: 
extractive taxation
regime change
French Revolution
state capacity.
JEL: 
D74
H20
H31
O23
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.