Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316905 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11791
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
Analyzing U.S. House elections (2002-2010), measures of legislators' effectiveness, and exogenous increases in Chinese import competition, we document a conditional relationship between legislative effectiveness and electoral success. In districts ex-posed to large trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were more likely to be reelected compared to less effective incumbents. Instead, in districts exposed to small trade shocks, more effective incumbents were less likely to be reelected. Our results are driven by trade shocks affecting voters' preferences for policy change and, in turn, their support for effective legislators. Our results have consequences for the effectiveness of future legislators.
Subjects: 
legislative effectiveness
China shock
elections
trade shock
JEL: 
D72
F14
P00
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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