Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316842 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11728
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
Joint taxation of married couples represents a puzzle for welfare economics. We investigate whether political economy forces can explain its persistence. We develop sufficient statistics to determine whether a reform towards individual taxation would garner majority support and apply this framework to the U.S. tax system since the 1960s. Our findings indicate that support for individual taxation has increased over time. As of today, 50% of all married individuals would benefit from such a reform. Among those worse off are poor single-earner couples. A reform that reduces marriage bonuses also for them is rejected by a social welfare function that concentrates weights at the bottom of the distribution.
Subjects: 
taxation of couples
tax reforms
optimal taxation
political economy
non-linear income taxation
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
H21
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.