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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SWP Comment No. 8/2025
Verlag: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Apart from several infrastructure projects which ultimately failed, and a surprise visit by the icebreaker Xuelong off the Greenlandic capital, Nuuk, the People's Republic of China has long maintained a cautious and reserved presence in the Arctic in the shadow of Russia and its fleet of icebreakers. But in July and August 2024, three icebreakers - Xuelong 2, Ji Di and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di - made China's growing presence felt in the Arctic for the first time ever. Beijing is thus signalling more ambitious intentions, and the construction of a heavy icebreaker could enable China to establish a permanent presence in the Arctic Ocean. This development reached a peculiar climax in October 2024, when the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti ran the headline: "The Arctic is becoming Chinese." What are the reasons and implications of China's Arctic turn?
Schlagwörter: 
China
Russia
United States
USA
Arctic
Arctiv Council
polar power
Northern Sea Route
NSR
Belt and Road Initiative
shadow fleet
Bering Street
Murmansk-Memorandum
ICE Pact
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