Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315262 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Environmental and Resource Economics [ISSN:] 1573-1502 [Volume:] 87 [Issue:] 7 [Publisher:] Springer Netherlands [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1993-2033
Verlag: 
Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze, in a game-theoretic model, the strategic interaction between competing firms that source their inputs from either primary or recycled material. Because the manufacturers’ primary production today serves as input for the recyclers’ production tomorrow, manufacturers can limit the recyclers’ scale of operation by reducing their output. Improving the recycling process generates then two opposite effects: it reduces primary production tomorrow by exposing manufacturers to stronger competition from recyclers, but it also lowers the manufacturers’ incentives to reduce their primary production today. If primary production exerts a negative externality on the environment, then making the recycling process too efficient might be counterproductive. This intuition equally applies to remanufacturing.
Schlagwörter: 
Recycling
Remanufacturing
Circular economy
Strategic entry accommodation
JEL: 
L13
L72
O13
Q58
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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