Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315262 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Environmental and Resource Economics [ISSN:] 1573-1502 [Volume:] 87 [Issue:] 7 [Publisher:] Springer Netherlands [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1993-2033
Publisher: 
Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht
Abstract: 
Abstract We analyze, in a game-theoretic model, the strategic interaction between competing firms that source their inputs from either primary or recycled material. Because the manufacturers’ primary production today serves as input for the recyclers’ production tomorrow, manufacturers can limit the recyclers’ scale of operation by reducing their output. Improving the recycling process generates then two opposite effects: it reduces primary production tomorrow by exposing manufacturers to stronger competition from recyclers, but it also lowers the manufacturers’ incentives to reduce their primary production today. If primary production exerts a negative externality on the environment, then making the recycling process too efficient might be counterproductive. This intuition equally applies to remanufacturing.
Subjects: 
Recycling
Remanufacturing
Circular economy
Strategic entry accommodation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Additional Information: 
L13;L72;O13;Q58
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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