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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11615
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the effects of the 2017 multilateral automatic exchange of information (AEoI) on tax compliance in Switzerland. Using detailed administrative tax data and difference-in-differences designs, I find significant positive compliance effects. The AEoI prompted 107k taxpayers (2% of all) to participate in the amnesty, disclosing CHF 42.3 billion—over 6% of GDP. At the micro level, once evaders participate in the amnesty, their reported wealth increases by approximately 50% on average, with compliance effects persisting in the medium run. Furthermore, I document that tax evasion in Switzerland is widespread and significantly more evenly distributed than in other countries.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
AEoI
compliance
enforcement
CRS
tax amnesty
inequality
JEL: 
D31
F38
F42
H24
H26
K34
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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