Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314648 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11609
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
Following Russia's attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Western countries have been providing military assistance to Ukraine. However, relative to GDP, the support from the small Baltic and Nordic countries has been greater than that of the larger European NATO countries. This article introduces first an alliance model to examine the incentive for alliance member countries to invest in their own national security in a deterrence equilibrium with no warfare. It is shown that an underinvestment incentive arises. The Russian invasion to Ukraine changed the rules of the game. Therefore, the article offers an explanation for the distribution of Ukrainian military assistance based on the national security classification of European NATO member states in a two-stage game-theoretic model. This distribution turns out to be conditional on the expectations associated with the second stage of the war game if Russia wins the war in its first stage and if there is uncertainty about NATO's ability to commit to its Article 5 to provide security to all of its members.
Subjects: 
military aid to Ukraine
alliance theory
NATO
two-stage game
JEL: 
D72
D74
H56
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.