Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313010 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 25-013
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of higher personal income taxes on CEO and firm performance in publicly traded US firms. In response to higher taxes on compensation, CEOs are less likely to reach performance goals and spend more time working in boards outside of their firm. At the same time, firm performance drops before eventually recovering as investment projects with below average profitability are disregarded and due to adjustments in CEO compensation.
Subjects: 
Executive Compensation
Personal Income Taxation
Firm Performance
JEL: 
H24
M12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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