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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 25-009
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without additional incentives. We propose the use of a wait time auction, where individuals bid the amount of time they are willing to wait in exchange for a specified subsidy amount. This design enables more direct targeting of marginal individuals, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the subsidy program. Furthermore, screening is costless in equilibrium as no wait times are imposed, and practical robustness against deviations from equilibrium behavior can be ensured by implementing a maximum allowable bid.
Schlagwörter: 
Subsidies
Market Design
Auctions
JEL: 
D47
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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