Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312194 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 24-076
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
Though the use of tracking policies to stratify students is commonplace, evi- dence concerning the effects of ability-based tracking on student performance is mixed. Using rich data from the Hungarian secondary school centralized assignment mechanism and a quasi-experimental framework, we find that at- tending the highest track noticeably improves standardized test scores and university aspirations two years post-match. Heterogeneity analysis finds this effect is independent of socioeconomic status, prior achievement, and parents' educational attainment, and we find only limited evidence of peer spillover effects in terms of academic ability. Given socioeconomic disparities in track placement, tracking may reinforce educational inequality.
Subjects: 
education
school choice
tracking
centralized school admissions
student achievement
inequality of opportunity
JEL: 
I21
I24
I28
E47
C26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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