Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312184 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 24-065
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
International climate negotiations have so far failed to produce ambitious climate cooperation. We combine laboratory experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris Agreement's ratchet-up mechanism, which requires countries to gradually increase their ambition, and a new policy proposal to negotiate more frequently. We find that more frequent interactions allow subjects to build trust and cooperation more safely over time. Conversely, subjects in a ratchet-up design tend to become more cautious to protect themselves from free riders. Thus, more frequent revisions of commitments promote cooperation, but the ratchet-up design fails to achieve the same result.
Subjects: 
Climate change
climate negotiations
cooperation
laboratory experiments
simulations
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D02
H41
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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