Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311017 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Managerial Science [ISSN:] 1863-6691 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 7 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 2349-2374
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
This paper presents a review of research regarding the effects of monetary executive incentives on risk-taking. More precisely, we investigate executives' risk-taking (i) in response to the curvature (steepness, convexity, concavity) of the compensation function and (ii) with regard to reference points. Thereby, we refine and update common textbook knowledge. In this vein, we identify essential moderators at the personal, firm, or environmental level that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the incentive scheme in a specific context. Implications for incentive system design in practice and paths for future research are discussed.
Subjects: 
Risk-taking
Risk behavior
Incentives
Management control systems
JEL: 
M12
M41
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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