Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311017 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Review of Managerial Science [ISSN:] 1863-6691 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 7 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 2349-2374
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a review of research regarding the effects of monetary executive incentives on risk-taking. More precisely, we investigate executives' risk-taking (i) in response to the curvature (steepness, convexity, concavity) of the compensation function and (ii) with regard to reference points. Thereby, we refine and update common textbook knowledge. In this vein, we identify essential moderators at the personal, firm, or environmental level that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the incentive scheme in a specific context. Implications for incentive system design in practice and paths for future research are discussed.
Schlagwörter: 
Risk-taking
Risk behavior
Incentives
Management control systems
JEL: 
M12
M41
M52
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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