Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308357 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11461
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We show that politicians facing a binding term limit are more likely to engage in financial de-liberalisation than those facing re-election, but only in the wake of a financial crisis. In particular, they implement policies that tend to favour incumbent financial institutions over the general population, such as increasing barriers to entry in the banking sector. We rationalise this behaviour with a theory of political accountability in which crises generate two opposite effects: they increase the salience of financial policies to voters but also create a window of opportunity for politicians captured by the financial industry to push potentially harmful reforms. In line with the implications of our model, we show that revolving doors between the government and the financial sector play a key role in encouraging bank-friendly policies after crises.
Subjects: 
financial crises
political accountability
democracies
term-limits
special-interest groups
JEL: 
D72
D78
G01
P11
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.