Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307667 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2024-08
Publisher: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Abstract: 
We study cooperation in an environment where public good providers face the decision to accept a newcomer to their group. A bottom-up process for accepting new members to social groups reveals individual preferences to include newcomers. Alternatively, inclusion can be decided in a top-down process by a third party. We present data from an online public good experiment, varying first whether inclusion of a newcomer is exogenously imposed through a random draw or endogenously decided on by the group members through a majority voting rule. Secondly, we target uncertainty about the behavior of the newcomer by providing feedback information on previous prosocial behavior from a dictator-to-charity task of the newcomer. The results demonstrate a high general willingness to include newcomers, with the voting process resulting in significantly higher inclusion rates compared to the exogenous process. The prosocial information neither affects aggregate inclusion nor aggregate cooperation outcomes significantly. Providing information on prior prosocialty, however, constitutes a significant determinant for individual behavior: it directly affects the likelihood of group members to vote for inclusion, as well as influencing expectations on future cooperativeness of the newcomer.
Subjects: 
endogenous group formation
inclusion
public good
charitable giving
cooperation
JEL: 
C72
C92
D64
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.