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Accepting the Newcomer: Do Information and Voting Shape Cooperation within Groups?

Alexandra Baier[§] Natalie Struwe^{†*}

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Abstract

We study cooperation in an environment where public good providers face the decision to accept a newcomer to their group. A bottom-up process for accepting new members to social groups reveals individual preferences to include newcomers. Alternatively, inclusion can be decided in a top-down process by a third party. We present data from an online public good experiment, varying first whether inclusion of a newcomer is exogenously imposed through a random draw or endogenously decided on by the group members through a majority voting rule. Secondly, we target uncertainty about the behavior of the newcomer by providing feedback information on previous prosocial behavior from a dictator-to-charity task of the newcomer. The results demonstrate a high general willingness to include newcomers, with the voting process resulting in significantly higher inclusion rates compared to the exogenous process. The prosocial information neither affects aggregate inclusion nor aggregate cooperation outcomes significantly. Providing information on prior prosocialty, however, constitutes a significant determinant for individual behavior: it directly affects the likelihood of group members to vote for inclusion, as well as influencing expectations on future cooperativeness of the newcomer.

JEL: C72, C92, D64, H41

Keywords: endogenous group formation, inclusion, public good, charitable giving, cooperation

Declaration of interest: none

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1. Introduction

Cooperation within groups to voluntarily provide social welfare-enhancing public goods is widely observed in human societies. The experimental literature on public good provision demonstrates that cooperative behavior is robustly and consistently observed in repeated interactions within groups (e.g. reviews by Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011), with different groups sizes (e.g. Isaac and Walker, 1988b) and even in one-time interactions only (see, for example, Kroll et al., 2007; Cherry et al., 2005; Rondeau et al., 1999; Bilancini et al., 2022; Barcelo and Capraro, 2015; Struwe et al., 2024). This is despite the fact that cooperation in public good environments is characterized by the tension between self interest and collective interests - known as a social dilemma - resulting in free-riding incentives. At the same time, individuals commonly enter new social groups with whom they cooperate, or, from the other point of view, are often faced with the entrance of others outside of their existing group (herein referred to as "newcomer"). Such types of changes to group composition have been found to impose challenges to sustaining cooperation in groups (Grund et al., 2015; Otten et al., 2021, 2022; Salmon and Weber, 2017). This phenomena has been studied in the experimental literature under the common term of endogenous group formation.¹

One specific form of group formation refers to the admission of a new group member. When individuals have to decide upon inclusion of a newcomer, they are faced with a situation that resembles a two-stage dilemma, potentially affecting both the inclusion decision, and future cooperative behavior. Including a new group member increases the amount of effort the group can put towards providing the public good through a new potential cooperator, thus increasing the potential benefits from cooperation. At the same time, including a new group member also comes with a risk of inviting a potential new free-rider into the group, since individuals can benefit from other's cooperativeness without cooperating themselves. Thus, the inclusion decision involves a trade-off between increasing the potential gains from cooperation in the group, but at the same time increasing uncertainty about others' cooperation following the inclusion of an additional group member. This is emphasized by results from previous literature finding that a single newcomer to an existing group can have detrimental effects on cooperation levels (Grund et al., 2018, 2015). The authors hypothesize that this finding is driven by a pessimistic expectation of the group members on the cooperativeness of the newcomer and subsequent negative reciprocal behavior. Group composition has been shown to significantly affect cooperation in public good environments, with an additional free-riding individual "spoiling" the cooperativeness of the whole group (De Oliveira et al., 2015). Thus, based on expectations and social preferences, individuals could have an aversion to accept new members into their established groups. It

¹Previous literature in experimental economics has studied endogenous group formation by allowing individuals to enter or change a group that is providing a public good. This string of literature goes back to the seminal work of Tiebout (1956) that suggests the theory of "voting with one's feet" - the option to freely move to a group that best fits ones preferences - can overcome the under-provision of public goods. A first experimental test by Erhart and Keser (1999) finds only limited support for the hypothesized positive effect. Building upon this first finding, following studies started to analyse different interventions that could lead to the expected efficiency of free group formation either by holding constant the group size (Page et al., 2005), using costly selection of partners (Coricelli et al., 2004), allowing for sanctions (Gürerk et al., 2014) or communication (Brosig et al., 2005), or introducing specific formation rules to prevent free-riding individuals to solely follow high contributors (Ahn et al., 2008, 2009).

seems vital to investigate such dynamics, given that in many situations social groups (such as work teams, neighborhoods, and other types of communities or associations) need to integrate new members and maintain cooperation levels.

Using the controlled environment of an economic experiment, in this paper, we specifically consider the consequences of inclusion decisions on cooperative behavior. That is, we investigate a setting where a group of individuals are interacting once to provide a public good, and thereafter, a newcomer is potentially included into the group before the group faces once again a public good cooperation decision. Within this setting, we focus on some of the relevant behavioral and institutional determinants of the group member's willingness to include newcomers, as well as on the subsequent cooperative behavior following the inclusion decision for both group members and (potentially included) newcomers. Precisely, in two treatments, we contrast the relative efficiency of two different inclusion processes. In the ENDO treatment, group members can endogenously decide to include the newcomer via a majority voting rule. This treatment resembles real-life situations when groups rely on "bottom-up" initiatives where members themselves actively decide upon accepting the newcomer(s) into their group (e.g. communities voluntarily opting to accept migrants, community-owned housing where all members decide on accepting new housemates, accepting new members into social clubs or online communities). Contrasting the endogenous inclusion process, we also consider a treatment (EXO) where the inclusion decision does not depend on the group members preferences but is exogenously determined through a random draw. This is related to situations where inclusion is determined "top-down" by a third-party or agency that does not belong directly to the group (e.g. when authorities allocate migrants to communities, or when HR departments make hiring decisions without actively involving the team members).

Previous literature has identified that groups formed endogenously through either restricted entry rules (where existing group members must agree on a member to enter (Ahn et al., 2008, 2009)), or through partner selection rules (where individuals actively choose their group or partner (Coricelli et al., 2004; Page et al., 2005)), result in higher cooperation in public goods than groups formed exogenously by a third party (e.g. the experimentalist). The positive effect of endogenous partner or group choice on cooperation has also been documented in the prisoners dilemma (see, for example, Hauk and Nagel, 2001; Strømland et al., 2018) and in the minimum effort game (e.g. Chen, 2017). The study closest to ours is Ahn et al. (2008) who show that when groups decide on inclusion by majority voting under a restricted entry rule, individual payoffs are higher than when individuals can move freely between groups.² Importantly, that study, similar to most studies on endogenous group formation, relies on a bidirectional selection mechanism, considering circumstances under which individuals actively want to change between groups. The applied group formation mechanism we use allows inclusion of a new group member only from one party, referred to as a so-called one-sided or unidirectional selection process. Coricelli et al. (2004) provide evidence that the unidirectional inclusion mechanism results in higher public good contributions than the bidirectional mechanism. We contribute to the research on group formation by combining a unidirectional selection mechanism and restricted entry rules

 $^{^{2}}$ See Ahn et al. (2009) for the same majority voting mechanism applied to a setting with a congestible public good.

in our decision setting. The unidirectional mechanism abstracts away from the idea of free migration between multiple groups (potentially back and forth).³ Coupled with the single-decision setting that we investigate, our unidirectional inclusion setting allows us to focus on the existing group members' willingness to accept newcomers without being biased by potential motives of newcomers, or history of newcomers' strategic choices prior to the inclusion decision.

A further dimension in our study targets the uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of the newcomer. This uncertainty arises due to missing additional information on which individuals can base their expectations regarding the cooperativeness of the newcomer, other than extrapolating from past experiences with others. Since group composition of different cooperative types has been shown to strongly determine cooperation rates (see for example De Oliveira et al., 2015), especially those individuals motivated by norms of reciprocity and fairness considerations might be hesitant to include newcomers. Therefore, we consider in addition an information institution that aims to alleviate uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of the newcomer. In treatments EXOInfo and ENDOInfo, in addition to the respective inclusion process, we present to existing group members information on the newcomers' previous prosocial behavior as measured by a dictator-to-charity task (similar to the tasks used in Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Blanco et al., 2022, 2017). This type of information can help group members assess whether the newcomer is similar to them in terms of prosocial preferences and can thus be expected to also behave cooperatively towards the group in the future. This notion has been addressed in a wide range of studies, suggesting that groups created among like-minded people perform better than randomly created ones (see, for examle Gächter and Thöni, 2005; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; Ones and Putterman, 2007; Burlando and Guala, 2005; De Oliveira et al., 2015; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2010). Moreover, charity donations, among others, have been shown as important screening devices for behavioral comparability in the decision process of accepting new group members (Brekke et al., 2011) or choosing partners (Fehrler and Przepiorka, 2016). Previous studies on endogenous group formation commonly use previous public good contribution levels as information for participants to sort into groups with specific characteristics (Ahn et al., 2008; Brosig et al., 2005; Coricelli et al., 2004, among others).⁴ At the same time, however, the choice of providing information on previous public good provision potentially induces strategic incentives to increase ones' cooperation before being able to enter a new group (Coricelli et al., 2004). We contribute to this part of the literature by focusing on a setting where (i) newcomers cannot strategically adapt their cooperativeness in anticipation of the voting on inclusion, and (ii) where the information signal is based on previous *non-strategic* cooperative behavior through charity donations.

In short, our results suggest a high willingness to include newcomers in both endogenous inclusion treatments, resulting in significantly more included newcomers compared to the exogenous inclusion process where inclusion was determined from a random draw. The information institution does not further affect average inclusion outcomes or average public good provision. We

³Within a free migration setting, Erhart and Keser (1999) and Ahn et al. (2008) have shown that typically low contributing individuals try to follow high contributing individuals into new groups. This behavioral pattern rather hinders than fosters public good contribution levels.

⁴Other studies have used information on intended future contributions (Brosig et al., 2005) or information about individuals' personality traits (Ahloy and Hamman, 2019).

do, however, find a positive effect of providing information on prior prosocialty on the individual level, directly affecting the likelihood of group members to vote for inclusion, as well as influencing expectations about future cooperative behavior of the newcomer. Further, we find evidence for a positive reciprocal relationship between group members and newcomers due to the feedback information: higher previous donations increase both the likelihood of being endogenously included by group members and the subsequent contribution to the public good of the included newcomer.

2. Experimental Design

2.1. Decision Settings & Treatment Conditions

The experimental decision setting consists of two different types of players, referred to as "group members" and "newcomers". Group members are by default part of a group and can provide a (local) public good that has benefits to all members of their group. Newcomers are not part of that group and by default can neither provide the good nor receive the benefits from (local) public good provision of the group members. Through inclusion, however, newcomers can become part of the group and both participate and receive benefits from the public good.

Treatment	Inclusion process	Information ?	# Observations
EXO	exogenous (random draw)	no	 84 participants (21 groups) 80 participants (20 groups) 84 participants (21 groups) 80 participants (20 groups)
EXOInfo	exogenous (random draw)	yes	
ENDO	endogenous (voting)	no	
ENDOInfo	endogenous (voting)	yes	

Table 1: Overview of treatment conditions.

Table 1 presents an overview of the four implemented treatment conditions. We consider a 2x2 factorial design, varying whether group members receive information about the newcomer's previous prosocial behavior before the inclusion stage, and whether inclusion of the newcomer is endogenously decided by majority vote of group members (as described in *Part 2*) or exogenously determined (via a draw of a random number). Introducing feedback information on prior prosocial behavior allows us to examine whether group members' perception of the newcomer is driving the inclusion decision.

Each treatment consists of three different parts, that differ partially by player type, as described below. Figure 1 provides a graphical overview of the design and timeline of the experiment, outlining the different parts for both player types.

Part 1: Group members are faced with a standard linear public good game. That is, they are randomly matched in a group of size n = 3, receive an endowment of w = 10 Points that can be used to make a voluntary contribution $g_i \in [0, w]$ to a so called Group Project of size

Figure 1: Experimental design

 $G = \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i$. The Group Project constitutes a public good with an equal marginal per capita return (MPCR) of $\alpha = 0.5$ such that the cumulative value of a contribution exceeds the marginal cost of a contribution, e.g. ($\alpha * n > 1$). The payoff function for each group member *i* is given by: $\pi_i = w - g_i + \alpha G$.

Part 1 serves to establish a minimum common sense of "group identity" among the members in a group, as well as to provide statistical control for analyzing the change in group member's cooperation after inclusion.

Newcomers are not part of the group task but are confronted with a so-called dictator to charity task (as introduced in Eckel and Grossman (1996) and modified in Blanco et al. (2017, 2022)), where they receive an endowment of w = 10 Points and can freely decide how to distribute these Points between themselves and three given charities (WWF, Doctors without Borders and SOS Children's villages).⁵ We included a matching of 25% to all donations made by participants to ensure that is is socially efficient for participants to make donations via our donation task, as opposed to keeping the full endowment themselves and making donations to their preferred charities outside of the experiment. The payoff to a newcomer from this task is the remaining Points after the donation decisions: $\pi_o = w - (sum \ points \ donated)$, and the payoff to each of the charitable organizations is $\pi_{NGO} = (sum \ points \ received) * 1.25$. For newcomers, this

⁵Please note that we consider a general donation to the nation-wide charities. Participants were informed about the mission statements of each charitable organization before making the donation decision. For more details please refer to Appendix C

task is meant to elicit prosocial preferences from a non-strategic game, prior to the experience of the group-related game play. At this point, neither newcomer nor group members know that this donation decision might potentially be displayed to the group members. We discuss the procedures in detail in subsection 2.2.

Part 2 consists of a second round of the tasks presented in Part 1, depending on the outcome of the inclusion process in a given group. That is, if the newcomer is included into the group, they will join the group members in the second public good game. Otherwise, the newcomer will participate in a second round of the donation-to-charity task. We hold constant the endowment for all player types in each task in order to rule out that the inclusion decision is influenced by concerns about potential earnings of the newcomer. For group members, Part 2 consists of two stages. Stage 1 is the inclusion and belief elicitation stage. Stage 2 is the public good game as presented in Part 1, with either 3 or 4 players.

In Stage 1 in the exogenous treatments (*EXO* and *EXOInfo*) the inclusion decision is determined through drawing of a random number and group members are informed about this mechanism and the outcome. Specifically, the experimental software randomly chooses the numbers 0 or 1, where 1 indicates inclusion and 0 indicates no inclusion. In the endogenous treatments (*ENDO* and *ENDOInfo*) the inclusion decision is determined through a majority voting rule. That is, group members vote on the potential inclusion of the newcomer that is randomly matched to them. As long as the majority of group members (at least 2 out of the 3 group members) vote for inclusion, the newcomer will be included into the group task.

At the same time, in all treatments, each group member is asked to provide a (non-incentivized) belief on the expected behavior given the newcomer were to be included in their group. The precise wording to elicit this belief was: "In the event that the newcomer is included in the group game, how many points do you think the newcomer will contribute to the group account (between 0 and 10 points)?" This belief elicitation allows to investigate systematic differences in beliefs of group members voting for or against inclusion. In the treatments with feedback information (*EXOInfo* and *ENDOInfo*), the group members receive information on the amount the matched newcomer has donated in total to all three charitable organization in Part 1 before the belief elicitation.

In stage 2 of part 2, the outcome of the inclusion process (but not the voting behavior of individual group members) is communicated to group members and newcomers, and group members again participate in a standard linear public good game. Newcomers that have been included into the group now take part in the the public good game as described in Part 1, and receive the benefits from public good provision. Payoffs are identical to the description in Part 1. Importantly, we hold constant the MPCR of $\alpha = 0.5$, as it is commonly done in public good games with endogenous group formation (see for example Ahn et al., 2008; Page et al., 2005). This design feature is specifically chosen to rule out social efficiency concerns when a larger group translates to a reduction in the marginal value from the public good for existing group members. That is, we implicitly assume that an increase from 3 to 4 group members in our setting does not lead to crowding in the local public good.

Finally, in **Part 3**, all participants go through a questionnaire containing questions on socioeconomic demographics, self-reported motivations for decisions in the different tasks and questions on previous donation and volunteering behavior (see section Appendix C for details).

2.2. Experimental Procedures

We collected data using an online experiment programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016) with a total of 328 participants recruited via (Bock et al., 2014) from the student subject pool of the EconLab of theUniversity of Innsbruck (Austria). The sample size was pre-registered (https: //osf.io/g9wq3) and determined from a power analysis to allow 80% power to detect a difference between treatment and control group of 1.6 points (corresponding to a treatment effect of 16%), with conventional significance levels, i.e. alpha = 0.5 (power test was estimated using baseline data from Coricelli et al. (2004) and based on two-sample means tests). The data collection took place during November and December of 2022.

Participants were recruited into a total of 9 interactive online sessions and treatments were randomly allocated to sessions. At the beginning of each session, each participant would receive a participant-specific link to enter the experiment. This ensured that each participant could only participate once. At the beginning of each session, all participants received the instructions for Part 1 and had to go through a series of control questions. Importantly, participants could only advance in the experiment once answering all control questions correctly. Thereafter, participants where matched into groups of four (by arrival time on the group matching page) and randomly allocated to group member or newcomer.⁶ Participants then played the type-specific tasks in Part 1. After finishing Part 1, the three group members received feedback on the sum of Points contributed by all group members to the Group Project, their individual share from the Group Project and their payoff from Part 1. Each newcomer was informed of their total donation to all charities and their individual payoff from Part 1.

Then, all participants received instructions for Part 2. It was common knowledge in Part 2 that the newcomer would play the group task after inclusion or the dictator-to-charity game after noninclusion. Most importantly, in Part 1, participants do not know any details on Part 2 and cannot anticipate that there will be an inclusion decision that could influence newcomers' behavior in the donation task in Part 1 in a strategic way. In the feedback treatments (*EXOInfo* and *ENDOInfo*) both group members and newcomers were informed that the group members would observe the total donations of their matched newcomer from Part 1. After voting, participants were then informed about the inclusion outcome and played the respective tasks. The feedback in both tasks was exactly the same as in Part 1.

At the end of the session, participants were informed on the last screen about their final payments which was the cumulative payoffs from both Part 1 and Part 2. Points were exchanged into Euros using the exchange rate of 1 Point = $0.30 \in$. At the end of the experiment, payments to participants were done via Paypal transactions and donations to all charities were done after

⁶In the experiment we used neutral language and referred to group members as "Type A players" and newcomers as "Type B players" throughout.

the data collection. Participation took about 20 minutes and participants earned on average 7.84 \bigcirc . Further, we transferred a total of 137.25 \bigcirc in donations on behalf of participants, roughly equally distributed between the three charitable organizations (45.75 \bigcirc for WWF, 44.25 \bigcirc for SOS Children's villages, and 47.25 \bigcirc for Doctors without Borders). For more details on the data collection and payment procedures, please refer to Appendix B. For the full set of instructions and screenshots of the original experiment, please refer to Appendix C and Appendix D in the supplementary material.

3. Behavioral Conjectures

Our behavioral conjectures are rooted in concepts from behavioral economic theory and results from previous related experimental studies. We formalize three pre-registered conjectures that allow to derive causal evidence on institutional factors that determine behavior in the group as well as the provision level of public goods.

C1: The rate of inclusion (or: share of individuals voting for inclusion) will be higher in EN-DOInfo than in ENDO.

The first conjecture refers to the differences in inclusion decision within the endogenous treatments. Generally, in a public good setting, individuals have incentives to free-ride on the contributions of others, receiving the benefits from public good provision of others without contributing themselves. Inclusion of a new member to a public good does not change the prediction from standard economic theory considering fully self-regarded payoff maximizing individuals. In terms of social welfare, inclusion does imply a potential wealth effect at the efficient outcome, since inclusion increases the amount of resources the group has to invest in the public good. Thus, from a behavioral perspective, individuals motivated by altruistic, prosocial or social efficiency concerns would have incentives to vote for inclusion. At the same time, inclusion opens the door to potential free-riding by the newcomer on the public good provision of the groups members. Those group members motivated by conditional cooperation or positive reciprocity (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Sugden, 1984) might be hesitant to include a new group member. Providing feedback information on the newcomers' previous (non-strategic) prosocial behavior can thus provide a channel to reduce uncertainty about characteristics and perceived free-riding threats of the newcomer. This is also supported by previous literature, such as Brekke et al. (2011) who showed that social commitments, such as charity donations, can serve as a costly screening device. Similarly, Fehrler and Przepiorka (2016) show that charitable giving signals trustworthiness that increases the chances of being selected for social interaction. It is worth noting that, in principle, the given information could have a two-sided effect; it can increase the willingness of group members to include them, given the newcomer's previous behavior is perceived as prosocial, but it can also have the opposite effect if the newcomers' behavior is perceived as not prosocial (for example, if the matched newcomer did not donate anything to the charities). The aggregate effect is therefore an empirical question. Based on the observation that on average individuals donate substantial shares of their endowments in donation-to-charity tasks, we conjecture to find an aggregate positive effect (see Cartwright and Thompson (2023) for a recent review of experimental findings of the dictator-to-charity task).

C2: The contribution of group members to the public good after the inclusion decision will, on average, be higher in the endogenous treatments ENDO and ENDOInfo than in the exogenous treatments EXO and EXOInfo.

C3: The contribution to the public good of included newcomers will, on average, be higher in the endogenous treatments compared to the exogenous treatments, irrespective of feedback.

Conjectures 2 and 3 refer to the expected treatment effects on cooperation as measured by public good contribution levels. Literature on endogenous group formation clearly shows that the underlying rules that govern how groups are formed are influencing collective action behavior and that endogenously formed groups show higher levels of public good contributions when restrictions are possible compared to free movement (Ahn et al., 2008; Coricelli et al., 2004; Brosig et al., 2005; Page et al., 2005). Further, evidence suggests that self-chosen teams can cooperate better and mitigate free-riding compared to those chosen through a random, exogenous process (Chen and Gong, 2018). Thus, we conjecture that the endogenous formation process translates into higher contributions from the group members (C2) as well as from the included newcomer (C3) as compared to a random, exogenous group formation process. The latter conjecture can be based on positive conditional reciprocity, which is one of the main motivations determining behavior in public good provision settings, as well as in various other social interactions(see for example Andreoni, 1988; Isaac and Walker, 1988a; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Croson, 2007; Sugden, 1984).⁷

In addition to the main behavioral conjectures on treatment effects, we pre-registered a series of exploratory analysis that relate to correlational evidence on individual-level characteristics determining the inclusion decisions, as well as on reciprocal cooperativeness. This includes addressing (i) contributions of included newcomers to the public good; (ii) the change in contributions of group members after successful inclusion of the newcomer; (iii) correlations between contributions to the public good of included newcomers with their individual donation to charities from Part 1; (iv) correlations between contributions to the public good in Part 1 of group members with voting probability; (v) correlations between voting and the newcomer's previous donations to charities in the *ENDOInfo* treatment; and (vi) the change in donations to charities of non-included newcomers.

⁷In the pre-registration, we formulated a final conjecture regarding the treatment effects on donations to the charities from newcomers that were not included into the group. C4: The donations to charity of rejected newcomers will, on average, be lower in the endogenous treatments compared to the exogenous treatments, irrespective of feedback. We report the analysis of this conjecture in Table S6 in the appendix. Note that the analysis relies on a very small sample size of endogenously rejected newcomers given the high observed inclusion rates in our data (which was not anticipated ex ante). We therefore give less weight to this analysis here.

4. Results

The presentation of results is structured around three subsections. First, we present results on the inclusion outcome in subsection 4.1. Next, we turn to analyse the treatment effects and determinants of contributions to the public good in subsection 4.2. And finally, in subsection 4.3 we discuss results on welfare effects due to inclusion. Table S1 in the appendix gives a descriptive overview of the main outcome variables of interest. Figure S1 to Figure S3 in the appendix additionally present the distributions of individual contributions, donations and expectations in the four treatments.

4.1. Results on inclusion outcomes: the effect of prosocial information and voting

Panel a of Figure 2 presents the average inclusion rates across treatments. Notably, in both endogenous inclusion treatments, where group members vote on inclusion, average inclusion rates are very high, with 95.2% (20 of 21) of newcomers being included in the *ENDO* treatment, and 90% (18 of 20 newcomers) in the *ENDOInfo* treatment. When inclusion was determined randomly, 52.4% (11 of 21) of newcomers were included in the *EXO* treatment and 70% (14 of 21) in the *EXOInfo* treatment. This difference between the two exogenous treatments is random and would diminish with a larger number of groups. In the following, we therefore pool the two exogenous treatments to discuss differences in inclusion rates compared to the endogenous treatments.⁸ In **Panel b** of Figure 2 we plot the marginal effects from probit regressions on the difference in average inclusion rates in the *ENDO* and *ENDOInfo* treatment compared to the pooled inclusion rates in the two exogenous treatments. We find significantly higher average inclusion rates in *ENDO* and *ENDOInfo* as compared to the pooled exogenous inclusion (p-values from Fisher's exact test to determine differences in proportions are p=0.004, n=62 for *ENDO* and p=0.027, n=61 for *ENDOInfo*). More precisely, the *ENDO* and *ENDOInfo* treatments increase the probability of inclusion by 40%-points and 32%-points, respectively.

Further, 87.3% of group members voted for inclusion in the *ENDO* treatment, while 76.67% voted for inclusion in the *ENDOInfo* treatment (p-value=0.051, n=41 from Fisher's exact test). Thus, we do not find support for our first conjecture (C1) and observe that the information on previous prosocial behavior in *ENDOInfo* does not result in higher votes for inclusion. In fact, the resulting inclusion rates are almost identical, with only one group in *ENDO* and two groups in *ENDOInfo* not including the newcomer.

Result 1: The endogenous voting process results in significantly higher inclusion rates than the exogenous process, signalling a high willingness to include newcomers to the social group. The prosocial information institution does not further improve inclusion rates.

The observed high rates of votes in favor of inclusion in the *ENDO* treatment suggest that there may be little room for an additional positive effect in *ENDOInfo*. Further, depending on the

⁸Notice that the average inclusion rate pooled over *EXO* and *EXOInfo* is 61%. This is a slightly more conservative approach than comparing the inclusion rates in the endogenous treatments to a 50% chance of inclusion - which would be the average from a random process in large numbers.

amount that the newcomer donated, feedback information may have adverse effects, as the signal may not necessarily be perceived as positive. We test whether group member's willingness to vote is impacted by whether or not the donations were above the average public good provision of the groups in Part 1. We find no differences in either inclusion rates or votes in the *ENDOInfo* treatment comparing groups that observed this "positive" signal to those that did not (all p-values > 0.1 from Fisher's exact tests). See subsection A.4 in the Appendix for details.

Figure 2: Panel a: Average inclusion rates across treatments with 95% CI indicated. Panel b: Coefficient plot and 95% CI of marginal effects from probit regressions for difference in average inclusion rates compared to the exogenous treatments pooled. Clusters on group level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005. See Table S2 in the Appendix for the full regression output behind this figure.

We now turn to investigating which factors might explain the individual willingness to include someone from outside the group. We conjecture the preference for inclusion to be driven by (i) the own cooperative behavior measured by the contribution to the public good in Part 1, (ii) the information on the previous donation behavior of the newcomer, if observed, (iii) the individual's expectations about the contribution of the newcomer, and (iv) the average cooperativeness of the other group members in Part 1.

In **Panel a** of Figure 3 we show the results from probit regressions with clusters at the group level, where the dependent variable is the individual vote, and explanatory variables for ENDOand ENDOInfo are the expectation of the newcomer's contribution if inclusion happens (*expectation*), the average contribution of the other two group members in Part 1 (*lagged others*), the own contribution in Part 1 (*lagged self*). Finally, in a separate regression model (indicated by ENDOInfo (2)) we include the sum of donations of the newcomer in Part 1 (*sum donations*). See Table S4 in the appendix for these regressions including the self-reported motivations as additional explanatory variables. Firstly, we find that both an individual's own contribution to the public good, as well as the average contribution of the other two group members reduces the

Figure 3: Coefficient plots and 95% CI of marginal effects from probit regressions for **determinants of voting (Panel a)** and from OLS regressions for **determinants of expectations (Panel b)**. Clusters on group level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005. See Table S3 and Table S5 in the Appendix for the full regression outputs behind this figure.

probability to vote for inclusion in the *ENDO* treatment. That is, the higher the contributions of both the individual and the other group members, the less likely are group members to vote for inclusion. We do not find this negative relationship in *ENDOInfo*. This suggests that members in more cooperative groups are more cautious about including newcomers without prosocial information on them. Further, we find the expectations to play a crucial role in the decision to vote for inclusion in both endogenous inclusion treatments. More optimistic group members are more likely to vote for inclusion. In addition, the sum of donations of the newcomer in Part 1 is a positive and significant predictor of the willingness to vote for inclusion in *ENDOInfo*. Finally, the analysis including motivations as behavioral determinants shows that the probability to vote for inclusion increases for those who are motivated by social norms, while mistrust reduces voting probability (see Table S4).

Given the observed relevance of expectations on voting probability, in **Panel b** of Figure 3 we explore whether the provided feedback signal influences expectations in the two treatments with the information, *EXOInfo* and *ENDOInfo*. For completeness, we also explore insights into the determinants of expectations in the *ENDO* treatment.⁹ The results are derived from OLS

⁹Please note that this analysis was not pre-registered. We add this additional piece of analysis to explore the determinants of expectations.

regressions with clusters on the group level, where the dependent variable is the individual's expectation of the newcomer's contribution in Part 2 in case of inclusion.¹⁰ The independent variables are the newcomer's sum of donations in Part 1 (*sum donation*), as well as own and others' average contribution to the public good in Part 1 (*lagged self* and *lagged others*). Most importantly, expectations are positively and highly significantly influenced by the sum of donations of the newcomer in both the exogenous and the endogenous treatments with feedback. Thus, although we do not find the information provided in *ENDOInfo* to affect average inclusion outcomes, participants do not disregard the signal as pure noise. Group members in both feedback treatments use the signal to inform their expectations, and in case group members can decide upon inclusion, the more prosocial the newcomers the more likely they are to get votes for inclusion.

Result 2: Newcomers' previous prosocial behavior positively affects both the group members' expectations about future cooperation and the willingness to vote for inclusion.

4.2. Results on cooperative behavior after the inclusion decision

We now turn to the question how the considered institutions (voting & feedback) for the inclusion process shape subsequent choices of both group members and newcomers. That is, whether endogenous or exogenous inclusion affect contributions in the voluntary contribution mechanism differently. To this end, we compare average public good contributions in Part 2 of existing group members and included newcomers across treatments. We further analyze the evolution of prosocial behavior by testing the change in behavior from Part 1 to Part 2 across treatments and address the determinants of contribution decisions in the different treatments. For summary statistics on average contributions of group members and newcomers across the four treatments please refer to Table S1 in the Appendix.

4.2.1. Institutional effects on average contributions after inclusion

To test for differences in average contributions we use OLS regressions with clusters on the group level, where the dependent variable is an individual's contribution to the public good in Part 2. In Figure 4 we present respective coefficient plots and 95% confidence intervals. In **Panel a**, we compare contributions by group members and included newcomers between treatments. In each of the four regression models (represented by each of the plotted coefficients), the main explanatory variable is a dummy variable indicating the treatments *ENDO* and *ENDOInfo*, where the respective comparisons are made to the *EXO* and *EXOInfo* treatments. In addition, in the two regression models for group members' contributions, we control for the average contribution of the other group members during Part 1.

We find that contributions of group members as well as included newcomers are not significantly different in the treatments with endogenous inclusion than in the ones with random (exogenous)

¹⁰Note that, on average, expectations of included newcomer's contributions do not differ between treatments (see Table S1 and Figure S2 in the Appendix).

inclusion processes, irrespective of whether feedback on the newcomer's previous behavior is reported or not. Precisely, the difference in contributions of group members between EXO and ENDO is 1.4% points (p-value=0.84), and for newcomers it is 16.7 % points (p-value=0.2). Similarly, the difference in contributions of group members comparing EXOInfo and ENDOInfo is 3.3% points (p-value=0.64) and for newcomers it is 2.2 % points (p-value=0.85). Also pooling over the feedback institution (that is, considering endogenous vs exogenous inclusion processes, irrespective of the feedback) does not result in significant differences (difference for group members is 1.9% points, p-value = 0.67, and for newcomers 6.2% points, p-value=0.47). These results lead us to reject our conjectures C2 and C3.

Figure 4: Coefficient plots and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression on Average Treatment Effects for differences in contributions between treatments (**Panel a**) and withintreatment differences in contributions between group members and included newcomers (**Panel b**). Clusters on group level, * p < 0.10. See Table S7 and Table S8 in the Appendix for the full regression output behind these figures.

Result 3: Compared to a "top-down" inclusion process, the voting process does not subsequently induce higher average contributions for either group members nor included newcomers.

Additionally, in **Panel b** of Figure 4, we test for differences within groups between group member's and newcomer's contributions, for each treatment separately. We regress a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a group member or an included newcomer on individual contributions in Part 2 and control for the group's sum of contributions in Part 1. Within treatments we observe that, on average, group member's and newcomer's contributions to the public good do not systematically differ from each other (all p-values > 0.1, with the exception of *ENDOInfo* where p=0.08). The distribution of contributions by included newcomers and group members are also not significantly different from each other (see Figure S1 and Figure S3 in the Appendix). Finally, we explore whether individuals in an endogenously formed group change their measured cooperativeness systematically different to those in exogenously formed groups. We find that the voting process does not affect the evolution of prosocial behavior differently compared to the "top-down" inclusion. However, in groups formed by voting, the change in prosociality is significantly larger for newcomers than for existent group members. See subsection A.5 in the Appendix for detailed analysis.

4.2.2. Determinants of group members' and newcomers' contributions

Turning now to the analysis of the determinants of group member's contributions, **Panel a** of Figure 5 presents the results from OLS regressions with clusters on the group level where the dependent variable is an individual group member's contribution to the public good in Part 2, for each treatment separately. Explanatory variables are the individual's expectation about the newcomers behavior in case of inclusion (*expectation*), the lagged average contributions of the other two group members in Part 1 (*lagged others*), and the own contribution in Part 1 (*lagged self*). In addition, for *EXO* and *EXOInfo*, we include the variable "included" that equals 1 if the newcomer was included, and 0 otherwise. For *ENDO* and *ENDOInfo* instead we include the variable "voted" which equals 1 if the individual group member voted for inclusion, and 0 if not. In **Panel b** of Figure 5, we consider the behavioral determinants of newcomers' behavior and show the results from OLS regressions with clusters on the group level, where the dependent variable is *lagged donations* which is the sum of donation to all charities in Part 1 of that newcomer. See Table S10 and Table S12 in the Appendix for the respective regression tables including the self-reported motivations for decision-making.

For group members, we find that in all treatments, one's own previous contributions are a highly significant explanatory variable for contributions in Part 2. Further, in the *ENDO* treatment expectations and lagged average contributions of the other group members are positive and significantly correlated with contributions, whereas having voted for inclusion has a significant negative effect on individual contributions. This is not the case in the *ENDOInfo* treatment. Being in a group where inclusion was exogenously imposed does not affect individual public good contributions. Interestingly, expectations do not determine individual public good contributions in the two feedback treatments, *EXOInfo* and *ENDOInfo*. We do not find systematic effects of motivations determining contribution behavior (with the only significant predictors for contributions being social efficiency motives in *EXO* and social norms in *ENDO*, see Table S10).

For included newcomers, we find that previous prosocial behavior positively and significantly correlates with contributions to the public good only in the treatment with endogenous inclusion and feedback information, *ENDOInfo*. In terms of motivational determinants of newcomer's contributions, we find for the *ENDO* treatment a positive correlation with efficiency concerns and a negative correlation with mistrust motives. In all other treatments, self-reported motivations do not significantly affect behavior (see Table S12).

Figure 5: Coefficient plots and 95% CI from OLS regressions on determinants of contributions for **group members (Panel a)** and **included newcomers (Panel b)**. Clusters on group level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005. See Table S9 and Table S11 in the Appendix for the full regression output behind these figures.

Result 4: The combination of a prosocial information and voting process allows for the development of a positive reciprocal relationship between group members and newcomers, positively affecting newcomers' public good provision after endogenous inclusion.

Finally, in Table S13 in the Appendix, we show the determinants of rejected newcomers' donations in Part 2, pooled across all treatment conditions. The results show that previous donations correlate positively and significantly with donations in Part 2. Most importantly, having been endogenously excluded does not negatively affect donations by newcomers, contradicting our conjecture C4. That is, on average, we find no negative "spill over" from group members refusing to include newcomers on their subsequent measured prosociality. Note, however, that this analysis relies on very small sample size of endogenously rejected newcomers, given the high inclusion rates in the *ENDO* and *ENDOInfo* treatments. This analysis was pre-registered, thus, we still report these results in the appendix.

4.3. Welfare Effects

Finally, we discuss some welfare implications of the inclusion process. Pooling over all treatments, we observe that relative to a group's endowment, groups with four group members in Part 2 do

not provide the public good at different levels than groups with three group members (all pvalues from t-test comparisons > 0.1). This result holds true also when separately considering endogenously or exogenously created groups. At the same time, the absolute provision level of the public good in larger groups is higher and should therefore translate into an increase of the welfare of these individuals compared to those in smaller groups. Indeed, pooling over all treatments, average payoffs from Part 2 in groups of size 3 is 12.09 points, whereas it is 14.28 points in groups of size 4, with this difference being significant (p-value<0.001 from two-sample t-test, n=82). Thus, in groups where the newcomer was included, individuals experience, on average, an increase in individual welfare of 18% as compared to groups where the newcomer was not included. Our results suggest that we observe a pure group size effect on welfare and groups not making use of the additional welfare that could be derived due to the higher total endowment available to be invested into the public good.

5. Discussion & Conclusion

In this experiment, we study the willingness to include a newcomer to an existing group and examine how different inclusion processes shape subsequent cooperation within groups. We provide experimental evidence differentiating an endogenous inclusion process relying on a majority vote by group members to a top-down exogenous inclusion process (relying on random selection for inclusion). Further, we differentiate the effect of providing information on prior donations to charities as a form of non-strategic prosocial behavior of the newcomer during the inclusion decision. While we find that inclusion occurs more often via the endogenous (voting) than the exogenous process, the prosocial information does not affect aggregate outcomes on inclusion rates or overall provision of the public good. Further, we observe that inclusion (either endogenously or exogenously) on average does not erode cooperation or introduce more free-riding. In absolute terms, larger groups produced more of the public good than smaller groups, making individuals better off.

The fact that providing the prosocial information did not result in overall higher inclusion rates does not mean that participants perceive the information as meaningless. To the contrary, we observe that the information on prior prosocial behavior allows for a positive reciprocal relationship between group members and newcomers to develop. On the one hand, previous non-strategic prosociality of newcomers is positively associated with expectations of group members on the newcomer's future cooperativeness and in turn increases the likelihood to vote for inclusion. Further, we find a positive relationship between previous donations and public good provision of newcomers only in the situation where both voting and the feedback information was in place. That is, when group members could base their inclusion decision on previous prosocial behavior, there seems to be some self-enforcement mechanism, leading newcomers to tie their public good contribution to their previous behavior. Similar dynamics in behavior have been found in experiments using commitment devices (see for example Jacquemet et al., 2019, 2021).¹¹

¹¹Generally, commitment devices such as making a promise/oath or offering an apology induce people to uphold their commitment and exhibit corresponding behavior in subsequent actions (Ellingsen et al., 2010; Ismayilov and Potters, 2016; Mischkowski et al., 2019; Vanberg, 2008).

Our findings suggest that our intervention in *ENDOInfo* may have similar effects on social image concerns, presenting an interesting avenue for future research to foster prosocial behavior of newly-included group members to an established group. At the same time, this shows that the information signal holds credibility. Group members are right to increase their inclusion willingness given higher cooperative behavior by the newcomer, as this correlates with higher future cooperation within the group. Given the relevance that expectations about the newcomer's future cooperative behavior have on the willingness to vote for inclusion, future research could explore the processes how individuals shape these expectations about newcomers and how further policy interventions (beyond communicating previous prosocial behavior) might translate into higher aggregate cooperation outcomes within groups.

We perceive three factors to be relevant for not having observed higher inclusion rates with the information provision that should be addressed in future research. First, we observe already very high inclusion rates in the voting treatment without prosocial information, leaving little room for further improvement of inclusion. Knowing that newcomers took part in a donation-tocharity task prior to the inclusion decision (as opposed to previous studies considering a history of strategic choices in public good games (Ahn et al., 2008; Brosig et al., 2005; Coricelli et al., 2004, among others)), might already be sufficient to prompt group members into increasing their willingness to accept others, irrespective of knowing the actual donation behavior. Second, our participant sample is drawn from a pool of university students, who are arguably more homogeneous than other groups may be. While we perceive this does capture many important field-related characteristics (such as joining a new workplace, sports club or association), one can assume that uncertainty and mistrust about a newcomer might be lower than in more heterogeneous group settings. In such cases, the prosocial information might be less important than in others. Finally, inclusion in our one-shot decision setting is cost-less to group members in monetary terms. Emotional costs of inclusion can include the threat of inviting an additional free-rider to the group (resulting in individuals feeling taken advantage off, after the fact; or, similarly, that an uncooperative newcomer might induce existing group members to reduce their contributions as a form of anticipated negative reciprocity). From a purely self-regarded payoff maximizing perspective, however, cost-less inclusion might increase the willingness to include newcomers irrespective of prosocial information. Importantly, in the single-decision setting we consider in this study, individuals might perceive the emotional costs of inclusion as less relevant due to there not being any future anticipated interactions in the group. Thus, comparing inclusion decisions to a setting with repeated group interactions constitutes an interesting avenue for future research.

Our results contribute to developing an understanding of the behavioral reactions to the processes of inclusion of newcomers into existing social groups. We perceive these as relevant for team leaders, local policy makers and associations or clubs making day-to-day decisions on how to organize their social groups. We consider our study informative for building cumulative evidence on inclusion preferences and cooperation across different complementary approaches using laboratory, online and field experiments (Czibor et al., 2019). It is in this sense that our experiments provide valuable insights into fundamental preferences for inclusion, as well as how information, expectations about the cooperativeness of others and individual motivations can shape these preferences.

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A. Additional Analysis

A.1. Overview of data

	EXO	EXOInfo	ENDO	ENDOInfo
Part 1 decisions				
contribution group member	4(3.22)	4.82 (3.44)	4.30 (2.95)	3.9 (2.98)
donation newcomer	$3.52 \\ (3.50)$	4.45 (2.98)	4.05 (3.07)	$3.7 \ (3.1)$
Part 2 decisions			· · ·	
inclusion rate	52.38%	70%	95.24%	90%
votes for inclusion	-	-	87.3%	76.67%
group member's expectations	$3.87 \\ (2.52)$	4.65 (2.74)	4.29 (2.04)	4.02 (2.55)
contribution group member	$3.97 \ (3.24)$	4.37 (3.19)	4.08 (2.93)	$3.78 \\ (3.1)$
contribution incl. newcomer	$3.73 \\ (3.41)$	5.5 (3.16)	$5.4 \\ (3.5)$	5.28 (3.29)
donation rej. newcomer	1.4 (1.51)	3.33 (3.44)	10 (-)*	0 (-)**

Table S1: Summary statistics of outcome variables in each treatment

Note: Table presents mean values of main outcome variables in the indicated categories. Standard deviations reported in parentheses. * based on 1 observation, ** based on 2 observations.

Table S1 presents averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the variables of interest: behavior by group members and newcomers in part 1 and 2, including inclusion rates, votes for inclusion, and expectations of group members regarding contributions of newcomers in case of inclusion. For inclusion and vote, we present the data as percentages; all other variables are in points of endowments.

First, concerning the contribution levels and donation levels in part 1, we find that across the four treatments, group members our sample contribute between 39% and 48.2% of their endowment to the public good. Differences between treatments are not significant (two-sample t-tests with groups as the individual observation level show that all p-values > 0.1, except for the comparison of *EXOInfo* and *ENDOInfo*, where the p-value is 0.08.). Newcomers donated between 35.2% and 44.5% of their endowment to the charities in total across the four treatments. None of the pairwise comparisons show significant differences in total donations between treatments (all p-values from two-sample t-tests > 0.1)

Turning to part 2, in all treatments we observe that on average, included newcomers make positive

contributions to the public good. Group members' average expectations regarding contributions of the newcomer in case of inclusion are not different across treatments (all p-values > 0.1 from two-sample t-tests. Rejected newcomers donations show no significant difference between treatments (comparing only *EXO* and *EXOInfo*, due to the low number of endogenously rejected newcomers in the other treatments).

A.2. Distribution of contributions and expectations

Figure S1: Histogram of contributions by group members

To test for differences in the distributions for contributions of group members, we use Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for equality of distribution functions across treatments. For both Part 1 and Part 2 contributions, all KS-tests suggest that the distributions are not significantly different from each other (all p-values > 0.1 for all pairwise comparisons). Note that in Part 1, all group members play the same decision setting (there are no treatment differences yet, such that differences in the distribution of contribution are not expected). For Part 2, these tests indicate that the the voting and feedback institutions do not affect the distribution of contributions by group members as compared to the control conditions.

Expectations over newcomer

Figure S2: Histogram of group members' expectations on newcomer's contributions

Kolmogorov-Smirnov suggest that the distributions for expectations are not significantly different from each other (all p-values > 0.1 for all pairwise comparisons). This suggest, that the voting and feedback institutions do not induce a difference in the distribution of expectations as compared to control conditions.

Figure S3: Histogram of newcomer's donations in Part 1 and contributions in Part 2

Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for equality of distribution functions across treatments suggest that both total donations of newcomers in Part 1 and contributions of included newcomers in Part 2 are not significantly different from each other (all p-values > 0.1 for all pairwise comparisons). In Part 1, all newcomers face the same donation decision setting (there are no treatment differences yet, such that differences in the distribution of donations are not expected). At the same time, for each treatment, the distributions of included newcomer's contributions in Part 2 are not significantly different from the distributions of group member's contributions in Part 2 (all p-values > 0.1 from KS tests).

A.3. Regression Output Tables for Inclusion Outcomes

Table S2: Marginal effects from probit regressions for difference in average inclusion rates compared to the exogenous treatments pooled. Clusters on group level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005.

	(1)	(2)
ENDO	0.399***	
	(0.125)	
ENDOInfo		0.316^{**}
		(0.121)
Obs.	248	244
Group cluster		

Table S3: Marginal effects from probit regressions for determinants of voting. Clusters on group level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005

	ENDO	ENDOInfo	ENDOInfo
	(1)	(2)	(3)
expectation	0.060***	0.082***	
	(0.016)	(0.024)	
lagged others	-0.050**	0.021	0.039**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.017)
lagged self	-0.037**	-0.001	0.031
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.019)
$\operatorname{sum} D$			0.027^{***}
			(0.010)
Obs.	63	60	60
Group cluster			

Table S4: Marginal effects from probit regressions for determinants of voting including selfreported motivations. Clusters on group level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005. Selfreported motivations taken from the post-experimental questionnaire, measured in 5-Iikert-scale questions, with answers ranging from "I fully agree" ... to ... "I fully disagree". For the analysis, questions were coded as dummy variables, with individuals receiving a 1 for a given motivation if they answered the question with either "I fully agree" or "I agree", and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the variables were measured in the following question: "This question refers to your decision to include the Type B player for group play. How do they explain your decision? I voted this way because..." Mistrust: "I did not trust the Type B player to contribute enough to the group project." Efficiency: "I wanted to achieve the highest possible income for the whole group (Type A and Type B players)." Social norm: "the inclusion of the type B player is the right thing to do, regardless of the decisions of the other players." For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix C

	EXOInfo	ENDO	ENDOInfo
	(1)	(2)	(3)
expectation	0.030^+ (0.017)	0.066^{***}	
lagged self	(0.011) -0.019^+ (0.011)	(0.010) (0.001)	0.028^{**} (0.013)
lagged others	-0.022 (0.014)	0.019 (0.017)	0.038^{**} (0.017)
mistrust	0.051 (0.045)	-0.218^{***} (0.065)	-0.235^{***} (0.082)
efficiency	0.209^+ (0.109)	0.007 (0.082)	0.045 (0.112)
social norm	0.208^+ (0.126)	0.310^{***} (0.071)	0.317^{***} (0.082)
sumD	. ,	. ,	0.018^+ (0.010)
Obs. Group cluster	63	60	60

	EXOInfo	ENDO	ENDOInfo
	(1)	(2)	(3)
sumD	0.480***		0.318^{***}
	(0.135)		(0.067)
lagged others	0.143	0.159	0.244**
	(0.171)	(0.118)	(0.083)
lagged self	0.248^{+}	0.343***	0.416***
	(0.121)	(0.083)	(0.071)
Constant	0.630	2.126***	0.269
	(1.394)	(0.590)	(0.478)
Obs.	60	63	60
Group cluster	20	21	20

Table S5: OLS regressions for determinants of expectations. Clusters on group level. + p < 0.1** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005.

A.4. Differential effect of Information on Voting

To account for potential adverse effects of feedback, we construct a variable called *above average donations* which takes the value 1 if the newcomer donated more of her endowment than the what the group members in Part 1 on average contributed to the public good, and 0 otherwise. We consider this a "positive" signal to the group members deciding upon including this newcomer. We find no differences in either inclusion rates or votes in the *ENDOInfo* treatment comparing groups that observed the "positive" signal to those that did not (all p-values > 0.1 from Fisher's exact tests). Please note that this analysis was not pre-registered. We add this additional piece of analysis in response to the missing treatment effect from *ENDO* to *ENDOInfo* which we anticipated for our pre-registered analysis plan. Of course the construction of a positive signal is ex post and subjective. Finally, a note of caution applies given that this sub-group analysis relies on small number of observations.

A.5. Within-subject change in prosocial behavior from Part 1 to Part 2

Here, we consider the evolution of cooperative behavior of both group members and included newcomers after successful inclusion. That is, we take the within-subject change in invested endowment towards the prosocial option from Part 1 to Part 2, and analyse whether we find between-treatment differences in this change of behavior. Considering first within-subject differences in individual Part 1 and Part 2 contributions of existing group members, we find, on average, no significant differences in any of the four treatments (that is, all p-values > 0.1 from paired t-tests). Similarly, the change in contributions (that is, the difference between contribution in Part 2 and Part 1) is not significantly different between treatments (all p-values >

0.1 from two-sample t-tests). Newcomers, on average, decrease their invested endowment to the public good by 15.5%-points after inclusion relative to their total donations in Part 1 in *EXO*, while they increase their contributions by 16.5%-points in the *ENDO* treatment. This difference between treatments is weakly significant (p-value = 0.068 from two-sample t-test).¹² In *EXOInfo* and *ENDOInfo*, newcomers increase their invested share by 11.4%-points and 11.7%-points, respectively and this difference between treatments is non-significant (p-value=0.99).

Table S6 shows the determinants of the individual change in prosocial behavior from Part 1 to Part 2. The regression results suggest that the change in prosocial behavior is not correlated with endogenous inclusion decisions, for either group members and newcomers. We do, however, observe that the change from Part 1 to Part 2 in endowment invested towards the prosocial option between newcomers and group members is significant in the two endogenous inclusion treatments, *ENDO* and *ENDOInfo*. Specifically, the difference between group members and newcomers is -15.2%-points in *EXO* (p-value=0.17) and 17.1%-points in *EXOInfo* (p-value=0.15), while it is 19.5%-points in *ENDO* (p-value = 0.02) and 14.1%-points in *ENDOInfo* (p-value = 0.04). See Figure S4 for coefficient plots on OLS regressions with the dependent variable being the change in prosocial behavior from Part 1 to Part 2 in a given treatment, with explanatory variable being a dummy indicating whether the individual is a group member or included newcomer.

(1)	(2)	(3)			
group newcomers	included newcomers	excluded outsiders			
0.224	1.461	0.625			
(0.289)	(1.081)	(0.437)			
-0.501	-	-			
(0.336)					
0.0699	-0.0400	-0.625			
(0.285)	(0.877)	(0.437)			
246	63	19			
0.006	0.030	0.022			
	(1) group newcomers 0.224 (0.289) -0.501 (0.336) 0.0699 (0.285) 246 0.006	$\begin{array}{ccccccc} (1) & (2) \\ \mbox{group newcomers} & \mbox{included newcomers} \\ 0.224 & 1.461 \\ (0.289) & (1.081) \\ -0.501 & - \\ (0.336) \\ 0.0699 & -0.0400 \\ (0.285) & (0.877) \\ \hline \\ 246 & 63 \\ 0.006 & 0.030 \\ \end{array}$			

Table S6: Determinants of change in prosocial behavior from Part 1 to Part 2

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.005, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

¹²On average, newcomers donated 35.2% in *EXO*, 44.5% in *EXOInfo*, 40.5% in *ENDO*, and 37% in *ENDOInfo* of their endowment to the charities in total in Part 1. None of the pairwise comparisons show significant differences in total donations between treatments (all p-values from two-sample t-tests > 0.1).

Figure S4: Coefficient plots and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression on change in points transferred to prosocial option in Part 1 compared to Part 2, between group members and included newcomers. Clusters on group level, ** p < 0.05.

A.6. Regression Output Tables for Contribution Outcomes

Table S7: OLS regression on Average Treatment Effects for differences in contributions between treatments. Reference category is the respective exogenous inclusion treatment. Clusters on group level. + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005.

	ENDO	ENDO		nfo
	group member	newcomer	group member	newcomer
ENDO	-0.137	1.673		
	(0.677)	(1.284)		
ENDOInfo			-0.332	-0.222
			(0.699)	(1.144)
lagged others	0.347^{+}		0.140	
	(0.178)		(0.223)	
Constant	2.603***	3.727^{***}	3.628^{**}	5.500***
	(0.789)	(1.013)	(1.224)	(0.840)
Obs.	93	31	96	32
Group cluster	31	31	32	32

	EXO	ENDO	EXOInfo	ENDOInfo
group member	0.273	-1.467	-1.190	-1.407^+
Constant	(1.039)	(1.008)	(0.890) 5.500^{***}	(0.747) 5.278^{***}
	(1.040)	(0.788)	(0.851)	(0.780)
Obs.	44	80	56	72
Group cluster	11	20	14	18

Table S8: OLS regression on within-treatment differences in contributions between group members and included newcomers. Clusters on group level. + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005.

Table S9: OLS regression on determinants of contributions for group members. Clusters on group level. + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005.

	EXO	EXOInfo	ENDO	ENDOInfo
expectation	0.476^+	0.225	0.501^{***}	0.226
lagged others	(0.240) 0.236^+	0.012	(0.141) 0.391^{***}	0.296
	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.097)	(0.186)
lagged self	0.479^{**} (0.167)	0.431^{**} (0.145)	0.530^{***} (0.114)	0.673^{***} (0.105)
included	0.015 (0.468)	-0.227 (0.551)		
vote			-1.508^{**} (0.574)	-0.342 (0.547)
Constant	-0.744 (0.537)	1.348 (0.986)	-0.709 (0.866)	-0.641 (0.843)
Obs.	63	60	63	60
Group cluster	21	20	21	20

Table S10: OLS regression on determinants of contributions for group members including self-reported motivations. Clusters on group level. + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005. Self-reported motivations taken from the post-experimental questionnaire, measured in 5-Iikert-scale questions, with answers ranging from "I fully agree" ... to ... "I fully disagree". For the analysis, questions were coded as dummy variables, with individuals receiving a 1 for a given motivation if they answered the question with either "I fully agree" or "I agree", and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the variables were measured in the following question: "TThis question is about your allocations to the group project. Why did you choose the level of your allocation? I allocated this much because...." Mistrust: "I did not trust the other players to allocate much to the group project." Egoism: "I wanted as much income for myself as possible." Efficiency: "I wanted as much income as possible for the whole group." Social norm: "contributing to the group project is the right thing to do, regardless of what the other players decide." For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix C.

1	1	, 11		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
de.var: ind. contributions	EXO	EXOInfo	ENDO	ENDOInfo
expectation	0.509^{+}	0.224	0.406**	0.224
	(0.248)	(0.148)	(0.139)	(0.163)
lagged self	0.389^{+}	0.296^{**}	0.563^{***}	0.635^{***}
	(0.199)	(0.136)	(0.156)	(0.118)
lagged others	0.237^{+}	-0.0419	0.529^{***}	0.394^{*}
	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.111)	(0.200)
included	0.137	0.102	-1.285**	-1.663^{+}
	(0.431)	(0.448)	(0.521)	(0.823)
mistrust	-0.200	-1.528^{+}	0.316	0.132
	(0.422)	(0.825)	(0.450)	(0.562)
egoism	-0.756	0.181	-0.603	-0.452
	(0.524)	(0.718)	(0.574)	(0.552)
social efficiency	0.863**	0.481	-0.448	1.177^{+}
	(0.379)	(0.864)	(0.835)	(0.572)
social norm	-0.758	1.211	1.165**	0.0521
	(0.497)	(0.827)	(0.514)	(0.528)
Constant	-0.0145	1.647	-1.363	0.0538
	(0.775)	(1.515)	(0.839)	(0.951)
Observations	63	60	63	60
R-squared	0.679	0.399	0.655	0.665

-	, I		
EXO	EXOInfo	ENDO	ENDOInfo
0.282 (0.328)	0.012 (0.348)	-0.105 (0.318)	0.642^{***} (0.163)
2.238	5.449**	5.795***	2.638***
(1.915)	(1.865)	(1.478)	(0.817)
11	14	20 20	18
	EXO 0.282 (0.328) 2.238 (1.915) 11 11	EXO EXOInfo 0.282 0.012 (0.328) (0.348) 2.238 5.449** (1.915) (1.865) 11 14 11 14	EXOEXOInfoENDO0.2820.012-0.105(0.328)(0.348)(0.318)2.2385.449**5.795***(1.915)(1.865)(1.478)111420111420

Table S11: OLS regression on determinants of contributions for included newcomers. Clusterson group level. + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005.

Table S12: OLS regression on determinants of contributions for included newcomers including self-reported motivations. Clusters on group level. + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005. Self-reported motivations taken from the post-experimental questionnaire, measured in 5-likert-scale questions, with answers ranging from "I fully agree" ... to ... "I fully disagree". For the analysis, questions were coded as dummy variables, with individuals receiving a 1 for a given motivation if they answered the question with either "I fully agree" or "I agree", and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the variables were measured in the following question: "TThis question is about your allocations to the group project in Part 2. Why did you choose the level of your allocation? I allocated this much because...." Mistrust: "I did not trust the other players to allocate much to the group project." Egoism: "I wanted as much income for myself as possible." Efficiency: "I wanted as much income as possible for the whole group." Social norm: "contributing to the group project is the right thing to do, regardless of what the other players decide." For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix C.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
dep.var: ind. contribution	EXO	EXOInfo	ENDO	ENDOInfo
lagged donations	-0.245	-0.0372	-0.127	0.443
	(0.199)	(0.219)	(0.206)	(0.279)
mistrust	-0.376	-1.477	-3.327**	-2.336
	(0.939)	(3.601)	(1.178)	(1.429)
egoism	-2.909	-0.901	-1.740	0.178
	(1.635)	(1.448)	(1.196)	(1.452)
social efficiency	3.664	2.825	3.093**	2.767
	(1.694)	(3.450)	(1.182)	(1.613)
norm	2.405		-2.651	-1.025
	(1.665)	-	(1.621)	(2.430)
Constant	3.841^{*}	5.714	8.953***	3.705
	(1.899)	(3.763)	(2.023)	(1.949)
Observations	11	14	20	18
R-squared	0.836	0.507	0.660	0.552

(1)
Pooled
0.789***
(0.128)
0.748
(0.735)
-0.0455
(0.427)
19
0.788

Table S13: OLS regression on determinants of donations for rejected new comers. Clusters on group level. + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005.

B. Details on data collection

Sessions

The data was collected via an online experiment using the subject pool of the EconLab of the University of Innsbruck. The experiment was programmed with otree (Chen et al., 2016) and the sample was recruited via hroot (Bock et al., 2014). In the invitation mail to the experiment, participants were informed that it was an online experiment lasting for approximately 20-30 minutes, and that the experiment would consist of simultaneous decisions and they were asked to enter the experiment in time. When participants registered for a session, they received a participant-specific link a few minutes before the official start of the experiment, so they could access the experiment simultaneously. After the main instructions, they had to answer six control question to test proper understanding of the experimental task. After the control questions, participants were randomly assigned to a group (based on arrival time on the matching screen) and a type (based on drawing of a randomly generated number). For questions during the experiment and for cases of technical problems participants had the contact information of one or the authors of this study.

Dropouts

In case a participant did not fully complete the experiment they were replaced by a computerprogrammed bot after a certain amount of time of inactivity had passed. This would allow the remaining group members to finish the experiment and receive their payment according to their decisions. The dropped-out participant did not receive any payment. Further, the data of the whole group was excluded from the analysis presented in this paper. In our data, this case happened once.

Payments

The final payment to a participant was the sum of the earnings over the two tasks in the experiment. Participants were informed about their overall sum of points earned and the corresponding amount in Euros in the last page of the experiment. For the payment procedure, participants were asked to give an e-mail address linked to their Paypal account. All participants were informed about these payment procedures in the invitation e-mail to the experiment. The payment information was stored separately from the main experimental data and deleted after payment to participants. This procedure was also common knowledge before participants signed up to take part in the experiment.

Donations

All donation decisions by participants were collected and the donations were done in sum to the charities after data collection was completed. The donations were done via PayPal transfers and a receipt was saved to prove truthful execution of the donations. All participants had the chance to indicate in the post-experimental questionnaire interest to receive information about the overview of total donations collected for each charity and donation receipts. All participants who gave explicit consent were contacted through their e-mail address with this information.

C. Experimental Instruction

Instructions - original version (german) translated to english

Welcome

Dear Experiment Participant,

Thank you for participating in this online experiment!

Please read the instructions for the experiment carefully. All statements in the instructions are true. The amount of your payoff at the end of the experiment depends on how well you understood the instructions. Your choices in the experiment, as well as the analysis of the data, are anonymous. Your answers will be analyzed only for the purpose of scientific research. Participation will take approximately 20-30 minutes and will be compensated via PayPal.

You will need an active PayPal account to pay via PayPal. Please provide your PayPal account email address on the last page of the experiment. Payment information will be deleted immediately after payment to ensure anonymity.

Please note that the payment information will be collected at the end of the experiment. If you do not complete the experiment, you will not receive payment.

Note: All personal designations in the experiment refer equally to all genders. There may be shorter waiting times during the experiment! If you confirm a page with "Next", the entry is final and you cannot go back one page!

If any technical problems occur during the experiment, please contact: alexandra.baier@uibk.ac.at (it is best to make a note of this address before clicking "Next").

By clicking "Continue", you accept the above terms and conditions and will be redirected to the experiment.

NEW PAGE

General instructions

In this experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices that will earn you points. At the end of the experiment, the points will be converted to euros at the exchange rate of 1 point = 0.30 or 10 points = 3.00 c.

The experiment consists of 3 parts with 2 decision situations and a survey. You will receive separate instructions for each part. You will be randomly divided into groups of 4 participants and remain in the same group for all parts of the experiment.

Your earnings in this experiment depend on your decisions as well as the decisions of the other players in your group.

There are two types of players in each group: three type A players and one type B player. You will be randomly assigned to either type A or type B before the first decision situation and will remain in that role for the entire experiment. The decision situations you play depend on the type to which you are assigned.

Type A players play a group game - Decision Situation 1 - over two rounds. Type B players play an independent task - Decision Situation 2 - for one round and either Decision Situation 1 or Decision Situation 2 in the second round. The specific descriptions for the decision situations are given below.

All Type A and Type B participants receive the same instructions and have an initial endowment of 10 points in each decision situation.

NEW PAGE

Instructions for Part 1

Decision situation for type A

If you are a type A player, you have the option to assign points to a group project. You can contribute any number between 0 and 10 points (in increments of 1 point). You keep the remaining points for yourself. For each point in the group project, you and all other type A members in your group will receive 0.5 points.

After all Type A members in your group have made their allocation decision, you will receive feedback on the total allocation for the group project and on the points you earned in this round (your "income").

Your income in this part is made up of the number of points you kept for yourself plus 0.5 times the total number of points contributed to the group project by all Type A group members. This means:

Income = 10-points you assigned to the group account $+ 0.5 \times \text{total points}$ in the group project.

Possible example:

Suppose the three Type A participants each award 1, 3, and 8 points, respectively, for the group

project. This means that the group project totals 12 points, and each Type A participant receives 0.5*12 = 6 points from the group project.

		Contribution	Earnings	Individual
	Endowment	to group project	from group project	earnings
Type A #1	10	-1	+6	15
Type A $\#2$	10	-3	+6	13
Type A $\#3$	10	-8	+6	8

Individual income of type A participants in points for this example:

Type B decision situation

If you are a Type B player, you have the option to donate points to a number of charities. You can donate any number between 0 and 10 points (in increments of 1 point). You keep the remaining points for yourself. For each point you donate to a charity, we will donate an additional 0.25 points.

You can donate to any of the following charities:

- WWF
- Doctors Without Borders
- SOS Children's Village

Your income from this part: 10 - points donated to the charities in total.

The donation that goes to each charity: 1.25*Your donation amount.

[Infobox: At the end of the data collection, we donate to each charity the total amount collected in Euros (where 1 point = 0.30). We offer you to receive an overview of all collected donations and the corresponding receipts from the charity organization as proof of the truthful execution of the collected donations. To do this, you must optionally allow us to use your mail address to send you this information after data collection. You will find the corresponding option on the last page].

Possible example:

Suppose a Type B player decides to allocate his endowment as follows: 1 point to WWF, 2 points to Doctors Without Borders, and 1 point to SOS Children's Villages. A total of 4 points will be deducted from the equipment.

This means that the type B player receives 10 - 4 = 6 points as income.

The amounts donated to the charities are equal to 1.25*of the allocation: so 1.25 points for WWF; 2.5 points for Doctors Without Borders and 1.25 points for SOS Children's Village.

Comprehension questions

Before you can proceed with the experiment, we ask you to answer the following comprehension questions. If you answer a question incorrectly, a pop-up window will tell you which answer to correct.

- 1 Each point a type A group member uses on the group project reduces his or her individual income by how many points?
- 2 Each point a type A group member uses for the group project increases the income of all type A group members by how many points?
- 3 If a type A participant spends fewer points on the group project than the other type A members in his group....
 - a. this participant receives a higher income than the other type A participants.
 - b. this participant receives less income than the other type A participants.
- 4 If each type A participant assigns 10 points to the group project....
 - a. Is the total income of all participants lower than if all type A participants assign 0 points.
 - b. Is everyone's total income higher than if all type A participants assign 0 points.
- 5 Each point that a type B player assigns to a charity reduces his individual income by how many points?
- 6 For each point a type B player assigns to a charity, the charity receives how many points?

On the next page, you will be randomly assigned to either Type A or Type B and a group.

NEW PAGE

Group formation waiting screen

for 6 minutes

Group assignment

Please wait for the other players in your group. This may take a moment.

Please do not switch tabs while you are waiting. If you switch to another tab, you will be made inactive and not grouped until you switch you back.

You are considered active as long as you are on that tab (indicated by a green dot), when you switch tabs you will be switched inactive after a few seconds and the dot will change color to yellow.

 $after \ timer \ expires$

ATTENTION:

Unfortunately, there are too few participants in the experiment to form a group. Therefore, unfortunately, you can not continue to participate in the experiment.

For your time you will get a compensation of $5 \in$.

Please send a mail with your Paypal information to natalie.struwe@uibk.ac.at.

We apologize for the inconvenience. You can close the browser now.

NEW PAGE

Type assignment

You have been randomly assigned to type [A/B]. The instructions for your respective task will be repeated on the next screen.

NEW PAGE

Part 1 - Type A

Decision situation 1

Your initial allocation is 10 points.

You can now assign any number of points (between 0 and 10 in increments of 1 point) to a group project. For each point in the group project, you and all other Type A members in your group will receive 0.5 points.

Your income = 10 points you assigned to the group project + $0.5 \times \text{total}$ points of the group project.

How many points do you want to assign to the group project?

Part 1 - Type B

Decision situation 1

Your initial allocation is 10 points.

How many points would you like to donate to each of the following charities (between 0 and 10 points in increments of 1 point)? For each point you give to a charity, we will donate an additional 0.25 points. You keep the remaining points for yourself.

How many points would you like to donate to WWF? How many points would you like to donate to Doctors Without Borders? How many points would you like to donate to SOS Children's Village? How many points would you like to keep for yourself?

Official mission statements of each charity:

WWF: We want to stop the global destruction of nature and create a future where people and nature live in harmony (www.wwf.at/de/ueber-den-wwfw).

Doctors Without Borders provides emergency medical aid in countries where health structures have collapsed or population groups are inadequately cared for (www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.at/ueber-uns/ziele-und-aufgaben).

At the heart of SOS Children's Villages is the effort to give children who have lost their parents or can no longer live with them a permanent as well as long-term home and a stable environment (www.sos-kinderdorf.at/sos-kinderdorf-erleben/unser-auftrag).

NEW PAGE

Feedback part 1

[Type A player]

Your initial equipment: 10 points

Your individual contribution to the group project: xx points

Total points in the group project: xxx points

Your share from the group project: xxx points

Your total income from this part: xx points

[Type B Player]

Your initial endowment: 10 points

Your total donations: xx points

Your total income from this decision situation: xx points

Instructions for Part 2

[Type A Player]

In Part 2, you play the same decision situation again, BUT now you and the other Type A group members have the opportunity to decide whether the Type B player can participate in the next round of your group game. This decision is based on a majority vote. This means that the type B player can only participate in the group game if at least two of the three type A participants vote to include the type B player. If they vote as a group to include the type B participant, the type B participant will also receive an initial 10 points and can allocate them to the group project, just like the type A participants. If you do not vote to include the type B participant, he will play the same decision situation as in part 1 again.

[Exo Treatments]

In part 2 you play the same decision situation again, BUT now there is a possibility that the type B player will participate in the group game. This decision is determined by chance. If the type B player is randomly assigned to the group game, he will also receive an initial 10 points and can assign them to the group project, just like the type A participants. If you do not, the Type B player will replay the same decision situation as in Part 1.

[Info Treatments]

Note: In Part 1, the Type B player in your group donated a total of xy of his 10 points to charity. Do you want to include the Type B player in the second round of group play? Yes/No In the event that the Type B player is successfully accepted into the group play, how many points do you think the Type B player will allocate to the group account? (This estimation has no effect on their payout!)

[Type B Players]

For Part 2, all Type A participants replay the same decision situation as from Part 1, BUT the Type A players now have the opportunity to vote on whether or not they should be in the next round of group play. The decision will be made according to the majority principle. This means that you can only participate in the group game if at least two of the three Type A participants vote for you.

If the type A participants of your group vote to include you, you will also receive an initial allocation of 10 points and can assign them to the group project, just like the type A participants. If you cannot participate in the group project, you will play the same decision situation as in part 1 again.

[Exo Treatments]

For Part 2, all Type A participants replay the same decision situation as from Part 1, BUT now there is a possibility that you will also participate in the group game. This decision will be determined by chance. If you are randomly assigned to the group game, you will also receive an initial allocation of 10 points and can assign them to the group project, just like the type A participants. If you are unable to participate in the group project, you will replay the same decision situation as in Part 1.

[Info Treatments]

Note: The Type A players in your group will be informed (before you make your decision) that you will donate a total of xy of your 10 points to charity.

On the next page, you will be told if you will participate in the group play just like the other Type A players.

NEW PAGE

Part 2:

[Type A + Type B]

Decision situation 2:

You have voted to include Type B for the group game. So now you play the group game with the other two Type A members and the Type B member. / The Type A players have voted to include you in the group game. So now you play the group game with the other three Type A members.

[Exo Treatment]

The Type B player has been assigned to the group play. So you are now playing the group game with the other two Type A members and the Type B member/ You have been assigned to the group game. So you are now playing the group game with the other three Type A members. Your initial allocation is 10 points. You can now assign as many points as you like (between 0 and 10 in increments of 1 point) to a group project. For each point in the group project, you and all other Type A members in your group will receive 0.5 points.

How many points do you want to assign to the group account?

[Type A]

Decision situation 2:

You voted against including Type B for the group game. So you play the group game again with the other two Type A members.

[Exo Treatment]

The Type B player was not assigned to the group game. So you play the group game again with the other two Type A members.

Their initial allocation is 10 points. You can now assign as many points as you want (between 0 and 10 in increments of 1 point) to a group project. For each point in the group project, you and all other Type A members in your group receive 0.5 points. Your income is 10 - points assigned to the group account $+ 0.5 \times \text{total points}$ in the group project.

How many points do you want to assign to the group account?

[Type B]

Decision situation 2:

The Type A players have voted against including you for group play. So you play the decision situation from part 1 again.

[Exo Treatment]

You were not assigned to the group play. So you play the decision situation from part 1 again. Your initial allocation is 10 points How many points would you like to donate to each of the following charities (between 0 and 10 points in increments of 1 point)? For each point you give to a charity, we will donate an additional 0.25 points. You keep the remaining points for yourself.

How many points would you like to donate to WWF? How many points would you like to donate to Doctors Without Borders? How many points would you like to donate to SOS Children's Village? How many points would you like to keep for yourself?

Official mission statements of each charity:

WWF: We want to stop the global destruction of nature and create a future where people and nature live in harmony (www.wwf.at/de/ueber-den-wwf).

Doctors Without Borders provides emergency medical aid in countries where health structures have collapsed or population groups are inadequately cared for (www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.at/ueber-uns/ziele-und-aufgaben).

At the heart of SOS Children's Villages is the effort to give children who have lost their parents or can no longer live with them a permanent as well as long-term home and a stable environment (www.sos-kinderdorf.at/sos-kinderdorf-erleben/unser-auftrag).

NEW PAGE

Feedback part 2:

[Type A or Type B player] Your initial equipment: 10 points Your individual contribution to the group project: xx points Total points in the group project: xxx points Your share from the group project: xxx points Your total income from this part: xx points

[Type B Player] Your initial endowment: 10 points Your total donations: xx points Your total income from this decision situation: xx points

NEW PAGE

Part 3: Questionnaire

In the last part, we ask you to answer the following questions:

[for all]

- how old are you?
- what is your sex/gender?
- what is your nationality? (Austria, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Other)
- what is your field of study? (Natural sciences, humanities, law, social sciences, economics, other).
- Do you work alongside your studies? (Part-time or during semester breaks)
- how understandable were the instructions for this experiment for you? (very understandable...not understandable at all)
- Have you donated to any charitable organizations in the last 12 months? (Yes/No)
- have you worked for non-profit organizations in the last 12 months? (Yes/No)

[all type A]

This question is about your allocations to the group project. Why did you choose the level of your allocation? Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:

I allocated this much because....

- ... I followed the example in the instructions. The players who allocate less than the others get more points as income.
- ... I did not trust the other players to allocate much to the group project.
- ... I wanted as much income for myself as possible.
- ... I wanted as much income as possible for the whole group.
- ... I wanted to contribute a part, but also wanted to keep a safe part for myself.
- ... I felt responsible to contribute something and not let my group down.
- ... contributing to the group project is the right thing to do, regardless of what the other players decide.
- ... I did not understand the assignment to the group project.

[for Type A endogenous treatments]

This question refers to your decision to include the Type B player for group play. How do they explain your decision? Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements: I voted this way because...

- ... I did not trust the Type B player to contribute enough to the group project.
- ... I was thinking primarily of the other Type A players in my group.
- ... I wanted to achieve the highest possible income for the whole group (Type A and Type B players).
- ... I felt responsible to include the type B player so that I don't let anyone in my group down
- ... the inclusion of the type B player is the right thing to do, regardless of the decisions of the other players.
- ... I did not understand the voting.
- ... Other:

[for all Type B players]

This question is about your donation decision(s). Why did you decide on your donation level to the organizations? Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements: I donated this much because....

• ... I don't trust that the money will actually be donated.

- ... I wanted to donate a part, but also wanted to keep a part for myself.
- ... I wanted to divide my points equally between the organizations.
- ... I could identify with some or all of the organizations.
- ... I felt responsible to donate something.
- ... donating is the right thing to do.
- ... I did not understand the donation allocation.

[for Type B players included]

This question is about your allocation to the group project in Part 2. Why did you choose the level of your allocation? Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements: I allocated this much because....

- ... I followed the example in the instructions. The players who allocate less than the others get more points as income.
- ... I did not trust the other players to allocate much to the group project.
- ... I wanted as much income for myself as possible.
- ... I wanted as much income as possible for the whole group.
- ... I wanted to contribute a part, but also wanted to keep a safe part for myself.
- ... I felt responsible to contribute something after I was added to the group game.
- ... I felt responsible to contribute and not let my group down.
- ... contributing to the group project is the right thing to do, regardless of what the other players decide.
- ... I did not understand the assignment to the group project.
- ... Other:

Payout

Overview of your income from this experiment: Income from part 1: xy points Income from part 2: xy points Total income from this experiment: xy points This corresponds to xy € (Reminder: 1 point corresponds to 0.35€)

The payout will be done via PayPal. Please enter the mail address of your PayPal account here:

Payment will be made after the experiment, but may take up to 5 business days. If you have not received payment after 5 business days, please contact natalie.struwe@uibk.ac.at.

Would you like to receive the donation receipts for this experiment after the end of data collection?

Would you like to receive information about the results of this experiment after the end of data collection?

If you would like to leave us another comment, please use this comment box:

End of the experiment

The experiment has now ended and your data has been saved correctly.

Thank you for your participation!

You can close the browser now.

D. Screenshots

Willkommen!

Liebe(r) ExperimentteilnehmerIn, Vielen Dank, dass Sie an diesem Online-Experiment teilnehmen!

Bitte lesen Sie die Anweisungen für das Experiment sorgfältig durch. Alle Aussagen in der Anleitung entsprechen der Wahrheit. Die Höhe Ihrer Auszahlung am Ende des Experiments hängt davon ab, wie gut Sie die Anleitung verstanden haben. Ihre Entscheidungen im Experiment, sowie die Auswertung der Daten, sind anonym. Ihre Antworten werden nur zum Zweck der wissenschaftlichen Forschung ausgewertet. Die Teilnahme wird ca. 20-30 Minuten dauern und über PavPal verzütet.

Für die Zahlung über PayPal benötigen Sie ein aktives Paypal Konto. Bitte geben Sie die E-Mail-Adresse Ihres PayPal-Kontos auf der letzten Seite des Experiments an. Die Zahlungsinformationen werden sofort nach der Zahlung gelöscht, um die Anonymität zu gewährleisten.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass die Zahlungsinformationen am Ende des Experiments gesammelt werden. Wenn Sie das Experiment nicht beenden, erhalten Sie keine Zahlung.

Hinweis: Alle personenbezogenen Bezeichnungen im Experiment beziehen sich gleichermaßen auf alle Geschlechter.

Es kann während des Experiments zu kürzeren Wartezeiten kommen! Wenn Sie eine Seite mit "Weiter" bestätigen, ist die Eingabe endgültig und Sie können nicht eine Seite zurück gehen!

Sollten während des Experiments irgendwelche technischen Probleme auftreten, wenden Sie sich bitte an: alexandra.baier@uibk.ac.at (notieren Sie sich am besten diese Adresse, bevor Sie auf "Weiter" klicken).

Wenn Sie auf "Weiter" klicken, akzeptieren Sie die oben genannten Bedingungen und werden zum Experiment weitergeleitet.

Allgemeine Anleitung

In diesem Experiment werden Sie aufgefordert, eine Reihe von Entscheidungen zu treffen, bei denen Sie Punkte sammeln können. Am Ende des Experiments werden die Punkte zum Wechselkurs von 1 Punkt = 0,30€ bzw. 10 Punkte = 3,00€ in Euro umgerechnet.

Das Experiment besteht aus 3 Teilen mit 2 Entscheidungssituationen und einer Umfrage. Sie erhalten für jeden Teil separate Instruktionen. Sie werden nach dem Zufallsprinzip in Gruppen von 4 Teilnehmern eingeteilt und verbleiben in derselben Gruppe für alle Teile des Experiments.

Ihr Verdienst bei diesem Experiment hängt von Ihren Entscheidungen sowie von den Entscheidungen der anderen Spieler in Ihrer Gruppe ab.

In jeder Gruppe gibt es zwei Typen von Spielern: drei Spieler vom Typ A und einen Spieler vom Typ B. Sie werden vor der ersten Entscheidungssituation zufällig entweder Typ A oder Typ B zugeteilt und verbleiben in dieser Rolle für das gesamte Experiment. Die Entscheidungssituationen, die Sie spielen, hängen von dem Typ ab, dem Sie zugeteilt wurden.

Spieler des Typs A spielen ein Gruppenspiel - Entscheidungssituation 1 - über zwei Runden. Spieler des Typs B spielen eine unabhängige Aufgabe - Entscheidungssituation 2 - für eine Runde und entweder Entscheidungssituation 1 oder Entscheidungssituation 2 in der zweiten Runde. Die spezifischen Beschreibungen für die Entscheidungssituationen werden weiter unten gegeben.

Alle Teilnehmer vom Typ A und Typ B erhalten die gleichen Anleitungen und haben in jeder Entscheidungssituation eine Anfangsausstattung von 10 Punkten.

Anleitung für Teil 1

Entscheidungssituation für Typ A

Wenn Sie ein Spieler des Typs A sind, haben Sie die Möglichkeit Punkte einem Gruppenprojekt zuzuweisen. Sie können eine beliebige Zahl zwischen 0 und 10 Punkten (in Schritten von 1 Punkt) beisteuern. Die restlichen Punkte behalten Sie für sich. Für jeden Punkt im Gruppenprojekt erhalten Sie und alle anderen Mitglieder vom Typ A in Ihrer Gruppe 0,5 Punkte.

Nachdem alle Mitglieder des Typs A in Ihrer Gruppe ihre Entscheidung über die Zuweisung getroffen haben, erhalten Sie eine Rückmeldung über die Gesamtzuweisung für das Gruppenprojekt und über die Punkte, die Sie in dieser Runde verdient haben (Ihr "Einkommen").

Ihr Einkommen in diesem Teil setzt sich zusammen aus der Anzahl der Punkte, die Sie für sich behalten haben, plus dem 0,5-fachen der Gesamtzahl der Punkte, die von allen Gruppenmitgliedern des Typs A an das Gruppenprojekt beigesteuert wurden. Das bedeutet:

Einkommen = 10 Punkte - Punkte, die Sie dem Gruppenkonto zugewiesen haben + 0,5×Summe der Punkte im Gruppenprojekt.

Mögliches Beispiel:

Angenommen, die drei Teilnehmer vom Typ A vergeben je 1, 3 bzw. 8 Punkte für das Gruppenprojekt. Das bedeutet, dass das Gruppenprojekt insgesamt 12 Punkte umfasst, und jeder Teilnehmer vom Typ A erhält $0.5 \times 12 = 6$ Punkte aus dem Gruppenprojekt.

Individuelles Einkommen der Teilnehmer vom Typ A in Punkten für dieses Beispiel:

	Ausstattung	Zuweisung zum Gruppenprojekt	Einkommen aus dem Gruppenprojekt	Individuelles Einkommen
Тур А #1	10	-1	+6	15
Typ A #2	10	-3	+6	13
Тур А #3	10	-8	+6	8

Entscheidungssituation für Typ B

Wenn Sie ein Spieler des Typs B sind, haben Sie die Möglichkeit, Punkte an eine Reihe von Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen zu spenden. Sie können eine beliebige Zahl zwischen 0 und 10 Punkten spenden (in Schritten von 1 Punkt). Die restlichen Punkte behalten Sie für sich selbst. Für jeden Punkt, den Sie einer Wohltätigkeitsorganisation zukommen lassen, spenden wir zusätzlich 0,25 Punkte

Sie können für jede der folgenden Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen spenden:

- WWF
- Ärzte ohne Grenzen
- SOS Kinderdorf

Ihr Einkommen aus diesem Teil: 10 Punkte - Punkte, die Sie den Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen insgesamt gespendet haben.

Die Spende, die an die jeweilige Wohltätigkeitsorganisation geht: 1,25×Ihr Spendenbetrag

Am Ende der Datenerhebung spenden wir an jede Wohltätigkeitsorganisation den gesamten gesammelten Betrag in Euro (wobei 1 Punkt = 0.30€ entspricht). Wir bieten Ihnen an, eine Übersicht über alle gesammelten Spenden und die entsprechenden Quittungen der Wohltätigkeitsorganisation als Nachweis über die wahrheitsgemäße Ausführung der gesammelten Spenden zu erhalten. Dafür müssen Sie uns optional erlauben, Ihre Mailadresse zu verwenden, um Ihnen diese Informationen nach der Datenerhebung zuzusenden. Die entsprechende Option finden Sie auf der letzten Seite

Mehr Infos zu Spende

Mögliches Beispiel:

Angenommen, ein Spieler des Typs B entscheidet sich für die folgende Aufteilung seiner Ausstattung: 1 Punkt an WWF, 2 Punkte an Ärzte ohne Grenzen und 1 Punkt an SOS Kinderdorf. Es werden insgesamt 4 Punkte von der Ausstattung abgezogen.

Das bedeutet, dass der Spieler vom Typ B 10 – 4 = 6 Punkte als Einkommen erhält. Die Beträge, die für die Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen gespendet werden, entsprechen 1,25×der Zuweisung: also 1,25 Punkte für WWF; 2,5 Punkte für Ärzte ohne Grenzen und 1,25 Punkte für SOS Kinderdorf.

Verständnisfragen

Bevor Sie mit dem Experiment fortfahren können, bitten wir Sie, die folgenden Verständnisfragen zu beantworten. Wenn Sie eine Frage falsch beantworten, werden Sie durch ein Pop-up-Fenster darauf hingewiesen, welche Antwort Sie korrigieren müssen.

1) Jeder Punkt, den ein Gruppenmitglied vom Typ A für das Gruppenprojekt einsetzt, verringert sein individuelles Einkommen um wie viele Punkte?

2) Jeder Punkt, den ein Gruppenmitglied vom Typ A für das Gruppenprojekt einsetzt, erhöht das Einkommen aller Gruppenmitglieder vom Typ A um wie viele Punkte?

3) Wenn ein Gruppenmitglied vom Typ A weniger Punkte für das Gruppenprojekt aufwendet als die anderen Mitglieder vom Typ A in seiner Gruppe...

 \bigcirc erhält dieses Mitglied ein höheres Einkommen als die anderen Gruppenmitglieder vom Typ A.

 \bigcirc erhält dieses Mitlgied ein geringeres Einkommen als die anderen Gruppenmitglieder vom Typ A.

4) Wenn jedes Gruppenmitglied vom Typ A dem Gruppenprojekt 10 Punkte zuweist....

🔘 ist das Gesamteinkommen aller Gruppenmitglieder niedriger, als wenn alle Mitglieder vom Typ A 0 Punkte zuweisen.

○ ist das Gesamteinkommen aller Gruppenmitglieder höher, als wenn alle Mitglieder vom Typ A 0 Punkte zuweisen.

5) Jeder Punkt, den ein Spieler vom Typ B einer Wohltätigkeitsorganisation zuweist, verringert sein individuelles Einkommen um wie viele Punkte?

6) Für jeden Punkt, den ein Spieler vom Typ B einer Wohltätigkeitsorganisation zuweist, erhält die Wohltätigkeitsorganisation wie viele Punkte?

Auf der nächsten Seite werden Sie zufällig entweder dem Typ A oder dem Typ B und einer Gruppe zugewiesen.

------ GROUP MEMBERS ------

Typenzuweisung

Sie sind nach dem Zufallsprinzip dem Typ A zugewiesen worden. Die Anweisungen für Ihre jeweilige Aufgabe werden auf dem nächsten Bildschirm wiederholt.

Weiter

Entscheidungssituation 1

Ihre Anfangsausstattung beträgt 10 Punkte.

Sie können nun beliebig viele Punkte (zwischen 0 und 10 in Schritten von 1 Punkte) einem Gruppenprojekt zuweisen. Für jeden Punkt im Gruppenprojekt erhalten Sie und alle anderen Mitglieder vom Typ A in Ihrer Gruppe 0,5 Punkte.

Ihr Einkommen = 10 Punkte - Punkte, die Sie dem Gruppenkonto zugewiesen haben + 0,5×Summe der Punkte im Gruppenprojekt.

Wie viele Punkte möchten Sie dem Gruppenprojekt zuweisen?

Rückmeldung Teil 1

Ihre Anfangsaustattung: 10 Punkte

Ihr individueller Beitrag zum Gruppenprojekt: 5 Punkte

Summe der Punkte im Gruppenprojekt: 14 Punkte

Ihr Anteil aus dem Gruppenprojekt: 7 Punkte (gerundet auf volle Punkte)

Ihr Gesamteinkommen aus diesem Teil: 12 Punkte

Weiter

------ NEWCOMER ------

Typenzuweisung

Sie sind nach dem Zufallsprinzip dem Typ B zugewiesen worden. Die Anweisungen für Ihre jeweilige Aufgabe werden auf dem nächsten Bildschirm wiederholt.

Weiter

Entscheidungssituation 1

Ihre Anfangsausstattung beträgt 10 Punkte.

Wie viele Punkte möchten Sie an jede der folgenden Wohltätigkeitsorganisation spenden (zwischen 0 und 10 Punkten in Schritten von 1 Punkt)? Für jeden Punkt, den Sie einer Wohltätigkeitsorganisation zukommen lassen, spenden wir zusätzlich 0,25 Punkte. Die restlichen Punkte behalten Sie für sich selbst.

Wie viele Punkte möchten Sie an WWF spenden?

Wie viele Punkte möchten Sie an Ärzte ohne Grenzen spenden?

Wie viele Punkte möchten Sie an SOS Kinderdorf spenden?

Wie viele Punkte möchten Sie für sich selbst behalten?

Offizielle Mission Statements der einzelnen Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen:

▼ WWF

wollen die weltweite Naturzerstörung stoppen und eine Zukunft gestalten, in der Mensch und Natur in Einklang miteinander leben (<u>https://www.wwf.at/wwf-oesterreich/</u>).

▼ Ärzte ohne Grenzen

leistet in Ländern medizinische Nothilfe, in denen die Gesundheitsstrukturen zusammengebrochen sind oder Bevölkerungsgruppen unzureichend versorgt werden (<u>https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.at/ueber-uns/ziele-und-aufgaben</u>).

▼ SOS Kinderdorf

Kindern ein liebevoller Zuhause in Würde und Wärme zu ermöglochen, sie und ihre Familien in schwierigen Lebenslagen zu unterstützen, gemeinsam mit ihenen Wege aus der Krise suchen - das ist die zentrale Aufgabe von SOS-Kinderdorf. (https://www.sos-kinderdorf.at/so-hilft-sos/uber-uns).

Rückmeldung Teil 1

Ihre Anfangsaustattung: 10 Punkte

Ihre gesamten Spenden: 5 Punkte

Ihr Gesamteinkommen aus diesem Teil: 5 Punkte

----- NEWCOMER -----

Anleitung für Teil 2

Für Teil 2 spielen alle Teilnehmer vom Typ A die gleiche Entscheidungssituation wie aus Teil 1 noch einmal, ABER die Typ A Spieler haben nun die Möglichkeit darüber abzustimmen, ob Sie in der nächsten Runde des Gruppenspiels dabei sein sollen oder nicht.

Die Entscheidung wird nach dem Mehrheitsprinzip getroffen. Das bedeutet, dass Sie nur dann am Gruppenspiel teilnehmen können, wenn mindestens zwei der drei Teilnehmer vom Typ A für Sie stimmen.

Falls die Teilnehmer vom Typ A Ihrer Gruppe dafür stimmen Sie aufzunehmen, erhalten Sie ebenfalls eine Anfangsausstattung von 10 Punkten und können diese dem Gruppenprojekt zuweisen, so wie die Teilnehmer vom Typ A. Falls Sie nicht am Gruppenprojekt teilnehmen können, werden Sie die gleiche Entscheidungssituation wie in Teil 1 nochmals spielen.

Hinweis: Die Typ A Spieler Ihrer Gruppe werden vor Ihrer Entscheidung darüber informiert, dass Sie insgesamt 5 Punkte von Ihren 10 Punkten an die Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen gespendet.

Auf der nächsten Seite wird Ihnen mitgeteilt, ob Sie genauso wie die anderen Spieler vom Typ A am Gruppenspiel teilnehmen.

Entscheidungssituation 2

Die Typ A Spieler haben dafür gestimmt Sie für das Gruppenspiel aufzunehmen. Sie spielen das Gruppenspiel also nun mit den anderen drei Typ A Mitgliedern.

Ihre Anfangsausstattung beträgt 10 Punkte.

Sie können nun beliebig viele Punkte (zwischen 0 und 10 in Schritten von 1 Punkte) einem Gruppenprojekt zuweisen. Für jeden Punkt im Gruppenprojekt erhalten Sie und alle anderen Mitglieder vom Typ A in Ihrer Gruppe 0,5 Punkte.

Ihr Einkommen beträgt: 10 Punkte - Punkte, die Sie dem Gruppenkonto zugewiesen haben + 0,5×Summe Punkte im Gruppenprojekt.

Wie viele Punkte wollen Sie in das Gruppenkonto investieren?

------ GROUP MEMBERS ------

Anleitung für Teil 2

In Teil 2 spielen Sie die gleiche Entscheidungssituation noch einmal, ABER jetzt haben Sie und die anderen Gruppenmitglieder vom Typ A die Möglichkeit zu entscheiden, ob der Spieler vom Typ B an der nächsten Runde Ihres Gruppenspiels teilnehmen kann.

Diese Entscheidung beruht auf einer Mehrheitsentscheidung. Das bedeutet, dass der Spieler vom Typ B nur dann am Gruppenspiel teilnehmen kann, wenn mindestens zwei der drei Teilnehmer des Typs A dafür stimmen, den Spieler vom Typ B aufzunehmen. Falls sie als Gruppe dafür stimmen den Teilnehmer des Typs B aufzunehmen, erhält dieser ebenfalls eine Anfangsausstattung von 10 Punkten und kann diese dem Gruppenprojekt zuweisen, so wie die Teilnehmer vom Typ A. Falls Sie nicht dafür stimmen, den Teilnehmer vom Typ B aufzunehmen, so wird dieser die gleiche Entscheidungssituation wie in Teil 1 nochmals spielen.

Hinweis: In Teil 1 hat der Spieler vom Typ B in Ihrer Gruppe insgesamt 5 Punkte von seinen 10 Punkten an die Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen gespendet.

Wollen Sie den Spieler vom Typ B in die zweite Runde des Gruppenspiels aufnehmen?

⊖ Ja ⊖ Nein

Für den Fall, dass der Spieler vom Typ B erfolgreich in das Gruppenspiel aufgenommen wird, wie viele Punkte glauben Sie wird der Spieler vom Typ B dem Gruppenkonto zuweisen?

(Diese Einschätzung hat keine Auswirkung auf ihre Auszahlung!)

Entscheidungssituation 2

Sie haben dafür gestimmt Typ B für das Gruppenspiel aufzunehmen. Sie spielen das Gruppenspiel also nun mit den anderen zwei Typ A Mitgliedern und dem Typ B Mitglied.

Ihre Anfangsausstattung beträgt 10 Punkte.

Sie können nun beliebig viele Punkte (zwischen 0 und 10 in Schritten von 1 Punkte) einem Gruppenprojekt zuweisen. Für jeden Punkt im Gruppenprojekt erhalten Sie und alle anderen Mitglieder vom Typ A in Ihrer Gruppe 0,5 Punkte.

Ihr Einkommen beträgt: 10 Punkte - Punkte, die Sie dem Gruppenkonto zugewiesen haben + 0,5×Summe Punkte im Gruppenprojekt.

Wie viele Punkte wollen Sie in das Gruppenkonto investieren?

Rückmeldung Teil 2

Ihre Anfangsaustattung: 10 Punkte

Ihr individueller Beitrag zum Gruppenprojekt: 6 Punkte

Summe der Punkte im Gruppenprojekt: 19 Punkte

Ihr Anteil aus dem Gruppenprojekt: 10 Punkte (gerundet auf volle Punkte)

Ihr Gesamteinkommen aus diesem Teil: 14 Punkte

Teil 3: Fragebogen (Seite 1)

Im letzten Teil, bitten wie Sie folgende Fragen zu beantworten:

Wie alt sind Sie?

Was ist Ihr Geschlecht/Gender?

O Männlich

O Weiblich

DiversKeine Angabe

_____**j**....

Was ist Ihre Nationalität

⊖ Österreich

 \bigcirc Italien

 \bigcirc Deutschland

SchweizSonstige

Was ist Ihre Studienrichtung?

O Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Sozialwissenschaften

O Naturwissenschaften

 \bigcirc Geisteswissenschaften

 \bigcirc Rechtswissenschaften

Sonstige

Nicht zutreffend

Arbeiten Sie neben dem Studium?

○ Nein ○ Ja

Wie verständlich waren die Anleitungen für dieses Experiment für Sie?

Überhaupt nicht verständlich

Haben Sie in den letzten 12 Monaten für gemeinnützige Organisationen gespendet? \bigcirc Nein

🔿 Ja

Haben Sie in den letzten 12 Monaten für gemeinnützige Organisationen gearbeitet?

 \bigcirc Nein

Teil 3: Fragebogen (Seite 2)

Diese Frage bezieht sich auf Ihre Zuweisungen zum Gruppenprojekt. Warum haben Sie sich für die Höhe Ihrer Zuweisungen entschieden? Bitte geben Sie an inwiefern Sie den folgenden Aussagen zustimmen:

Ich habe so viel zugewiesen, weil...

	Stimme zu	Stimme eher zu	Weder noch	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu
ich dem Beispiel in den Anleitungen gefolgt bin. Die Spieler, die weniger zuweisen als die anderen erhalten mehr Punkte als Einkommen.					
ich habe nicht darauf vertraut, dass die anderen Spieler dem Gruppenprojekt viel zuweisen.					
ich möglichst viel Einkommen für mich wollte.					
ich möglichst viel Einkommen für die gesamte Gruppe wollte.					
ich einen Teil beisteuern wollte, aber auch einen sicheren Teil für mich behalten wollte.					0
ich mich verantwortlich gefühlt habe, etwas beizusteuern und meine Gruppe nicht im Stich zu lassen.					
atwas tum Gruppanpraiakt haistawarn das Dishtiga ist					

Teil 3: Fragebogen (Seite 3)

Diese Frage bezieht sich auf Ihre Zuweisung zum Gruppenprojekt in Teil 2. Warum haben Sie sich für die Höhe Ihrer Zuweisung entschieden? Bitte geben Sie an inwiefern Sie den folgenden Aussagen zustimmen:

Ich habe so viel zugewiesen, weil...

	Stimme zu	Stimme eher zu	Weder noch	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu
ich dem Beispiel in den Anleitungen gefolgt bin. Die Spieler, die weniger zuweisen als die anderen erhalten mehr Punkte als Einkommen.					
ich habe nicht darauf vertraut, dass die anderen Spieler dem Gruppenprojekt viel zuweisen.					
ich möglichst viel Einkommen für mich wollte.					
ich möglichst viel Einkommen für die gesamte Gruppe wollte.					0
ich einen Teil beisteuern wollte, aber auch einen sicheren Teil für mich behalten wollte.					
ich mich verantwortlich gefühlt habe, etwas beizusteuern nachdem ich zum Gruppenspiel hinzugefügt wurde.					0

Auszahlung

Überblick über Ihr Einkommen aus diesem Experiment:

Einkommen aus Teil 1: 5 Punkte.

Einkommen aus Teil 2: 14 Punkte.

Gesamteinkommen aus diesem Experiment: 19 Punkte

Das entspricht 5,70 € (Zur Erinnerung: 1 Punkt entspricht 0.30€).

Die Auszahlung erfolgt über **PayPal**. Bitte geben Sie hier die Mailadresse Ihres PayPal Kontos an:

Die Zahlung erfolgt nach dem Experiment, kann aber **bis zu 5 Werktage dauern**. Wenn Sie nach 5 Werktagen noch keine Zahlung erhalten haben, dann melden Sie sich bitte bei natalie.struwe@uibk.ac.at

Möchten Sie nach Ende der Datenerhebung die Spendenquittungen für dieses Experiment erhalten? $\bigcirc\,$ Ja

O Nein

Möchten Sie nach Ende der Datenerhebung Informationen zu den Ergebnissen dieses Experiments erhalten? 🔿 Ja

 \bigcirc Nein

Falls Sie uns noch eine Anmerkung hinterlassen wollen, nutzen Sie bitte dieses Kommentarfeld.

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Alexandra Baier, Natalie Struwe

Accepting the Newcomer: Do Information and Voting Shape Cooperation within Groups?

Abstract

We study cooperation in an environment where public good providers face the decision to accept a newcomer to their group. A bottom-up process for accepting new members to social groups reveals individual preferences to include newcomers. Alternatively, inclusion can be decided in a top-down process by a third party. We present data from an online public good experiment, varying first whether inclusion of a newcomer is exogenously imposed through a random draw or endogenously decided on by the group members through a majority voting rule. Secondly, we target uncertainty about the behavior of the newcomer by providing feedback information on previous prosocial behavior from a dictator-to-charity task of the newcomer. The results demonstrate a high general willingness to include newcomers, with the voting process resulting in significantly higher inclusion rates compared to the exogenous process. The prosocial information neither affects aggregate inclusion nor aggregate cooperation outcomes significantly. Providing information on prior prosocialty, however, constitutes a significant determinant for individual behavior: it directly affects the likelihood of group members to vote for inclusion, as well as influencing expectations on future cooperativeness of the newcomer.

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