Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30662
Authors: 
Slemrod, Joel
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2777
Abstract: 
It is entirely appropriate that the study of public finance take seriously behavioral” inconsistencies with traditional models of individual and collective decision-making. This raises the question of whether the state should play a role in protecting individuals from themselves, and whether individuals are susceptible to manipulation, or even exploitation, by the people who comprise the state. In this essay I address one aspect of this issue how it affects an economic analysis of tax systems. In addressing this task I ask, and offer some tentative answers to, what is distinctive about behavioral tax economics as a sub-field of behavioral economics and as a sub-field of tax economics.
Subjects: 
complexity
compliance
JEL: 
H20
H27
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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