Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306222 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Econometrica [ISSN:] 1468-0262 [Volume:] 92 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1439-1472
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
This paper studies the role of fiscal capacity in European state consolidation. Our analysis is organized around novel data on the territories and cities of the Holy Roman Empire in the early modern period. Territories implementing an early fiscal reform were more likely to survive, increased in size, and achieved a more compact extent. We provide evidence for the causal interpretation of these results and show key mechanisms: revenues, military investments, and marriage success. The imposition of Imperial taxes, quasi‐random in timing and size, increased the benefits of an efficient tax administration on the side of rulers, driving the implementation of fiscal centralization. Within territories, Chambers became the dominant administrative institution, tilting the consolidating states toward absolutism.
Subjects: 
Fiscal capacity
state competition
war
Germany
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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