Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305613 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11371
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In a principal-agent model under moral hazard we examine the psychological and social motivations of the agent that influence the incentive compatibility condition (ICC) of the agent. Under “firm culture” firms emphasize that high effort is consistent with its culture. Under “industry-wide social norms” external to the firm, the social group emphasizes high effort levels. We only consider the case where the ICC is violated in the classical case. A significant fraction of the agents choose high effort. Firm culture backed by simple disapproval of low effort is more effective relative to our baseline under fixed wages. Strong social norms are as effective as firm culture under variable wages, but more effective under fixed wages. Firm culture dominates weak social norms. Variable wages induce high effort (incentive effects) but also crowd out intrinsic motivation in the form of (i) guilt aversion from not following firm culture and (ii) shame aversion from not following social norms.
Schlagwörter: 
incentive compatibility
insurance and incentives
firm culture
guilt-aversion
social norms
shame-aversion
JEL: 
D01
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.