Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305570 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11328
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We estimate the causal effect of the electoral system on corruption by leveraging a specificity of the French electoral law where the electoral system for municipal councils depends on municipal population. Specifically, municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants use an individual majority system, while those above this threshold use a proportional list system. Exploiting that discontinuity in a regression discontinuity design and using survey and actual corruption data, we find that the proportional list system results in higher levels of perceived and actual corruption than the individual majority system.
Subjects: 
corruption
electoral systems
local government
JEL: 
D72
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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