Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30457
Authors: 
Chowdhury, Subhasish M.
Kovenock, Dan
Sheremeta, Roman M.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2688
Abstract: 
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a guerilla warfare” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields.
Subjects: 
Colonel Blotto
conflict resolution
contest theory
multi-dimensional resource allocation
rent-seeking
experiments
JEL: 
C72
C91
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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