Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30428
Authors: 
McBride, Michael
Skaperdas, Stergios
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2897
Abstract: 
In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. In such environments we show that, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We demonstrate the theoretical robustness of this finding, discuss its applicability in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important.
Subjects: 
conflict
litigation
property rights
folk theorem
JEL: 
C72
C91
D01
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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