Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/301996.2 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IWH Discussion Papers No. 17/2023
Versionsangabe: 
This version: 03.03.2025
Verlag: 
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), Halle (Saale)
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine effects of government-imposed employment targets on firm behavior. Theoretically, such policies create “polarization,“ causing low-productivity firms to exit the market while others temporarily distort their employment upward. Dynamically, firms are incentivized to improve productivity to meet targets. Using novel data from East German firms post-privatization, we find that firms with binding employment targets experienced 25% points higher annual employment growth, a 1.1% points higher annual exit probability, and 10% points higher annual productivity growth over the target period. Structural estimates reveal substantial mis-allocation of labor across firms and that subsidizing productivity growth would yield twice the long term increases in employment.
Schlagwörter: 
industrial policy
privatizations
productivity
size-dependent regulations
JEL: 
D22
D24
J08
L25
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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2 10419/301996.2 This version: 03.03.2025
1 10419/301996 This version: 19.08.2024

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