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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1075-1107
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this environment. I show that there exists an optimal signal with two realizations, characterize the support of the signal realization recommending approval and show that the optimal signal is a hyperbola. The lack of knowledge of the receiver's prior causes the sender to hedge her bets: the optimal signal induces the high action in more states than in the standard model, albeit with a lower probability. Increasing the sender's ignorance can hurt both the sender and the receiver.
Schlagwörter: 
Bayesian persuasion
robust mechanism design
JEL: 
D8
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