Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289854 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WWZ Working Paper No. 2024/03
Verlag: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate whether US House representatives favour special interest groups over constituents in periods of low media attention to politics. Analysing 666 roll calls from 2005 to 2018, we show that representatives are more likely to vote against their constituency's preferred position the more special interest money they receive from groups favouring the opposite position. The latter effect is significantly larger when less attention is paid to politics due to distraction by exogenous newsworthy events like natural disasters. The effect is mostly driven by short-term opportunistic behaviour than the short-term scheduling of controversial votes into periods with high news pressure.
Schlagwörter: 
Attention
campaign finance
interest groups
legislative voting
mass media
roll call voting
US House of Representatives
JEL: 
D72
L82
L86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
814.6 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.