Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286497 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 175-206
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a dynamic model of competition in the media industry in which behavioral media outlets compete for the publication of scoops, and both the publication of scoops and their veracity determine an outlet's future audience. We study the dynamics of the audiences of outlets and how those dynamics relate to two issues: how harsh a society is with the publication of false stories, and how similar media outlets are in their editorial standards for quality. For the case of a duopoly, we show that there is only one stable stationary state. In that equilibrium, the two outlets coexist and which one leads the market (the low-standard outlet or the high-standard outlet) depends on a combination of the two issues mentioned above. We then use numerical simulations to analyze the general case with more than two outlets. The numerical results corroborate most of the analytical insights gained for the duopoly case. We also use numerical simulations to draw up predictions on the number of outlets that will survive in the industry in the long run.
Schlagwörter: 
Media industry
Competition
Editorial standard
Stochastic dynamics
Deterministic dynamics
JEL: 
D25
L10
L82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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