Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282457 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10769
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal referral fee under full commitment on entry decision and study its economic implications. We then analyze the extent to which the platform's own information sharing policy substitutes for its commitment to entry. We characterize the platform's optimal information policy and examine how it interacts with the platform's fee structure. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the platform's fee structure as a regulatory response in the policy debates on marketplace regulation.
Subjects: 
hybrid platforms
referral fee
information design
JEL: 
D82
D42
L10
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.