Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/280987 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 23-051
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder's valuation. I derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and show that it can be implemented by introducing a communication stage before an auction. I show that granting bidders a right to remain anonymous, i.e., to refuse participation in the communication stage, leaves the optimal mechanism unchanged and provides no benefits for the bidders.
Subjects: 
Mechanism Design
Auctions
Partially Verifiable Types
Communication
JEL: 
D44
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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