Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271962 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10318
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The OECD's proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decline of corporate tax rates. We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect from less profit shifting increases revenues in high-tax countries. A secondary effect, however, is that the value of attracting foreign investments increases, which intensifies tax competition. We show that when governments compete via firm-specific or uniform subsidies, the revenue gains from less profit shifting are exactly offset by higher subsidies. When competition is by tax rates, revenues may increase however.
Schlagwörter: 
global minimum tax
tax competition
OECD BEPS
Pillar II
JEL: 
F23
F55
H25
H73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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