Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267016 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 352
Publisher: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Abstract: 
Level-k thinking and Cognitive Hierarchy have been widely applied as a normalform solution concept in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Player's may learn about levels of opponents' thinking during the play of the game because some information sets may be inconsistent with certain levels. In particular, for any information set reached, a level-k player attaches the maximum level-l thinking for l < k to her opponents consistent with the information set. We compare extensive-form level-k thinking with other solution concepts such as level-k thinking in the associated normal-form, extensive-form rationalizability, delta-rationalizability, iterated admissibility, and backward induction. We use extensive-form level-k thinking to reanalyze data from some prior experiments in the literature.
Subjects: 
Level-k thinking
Cognitive hierarchy
Theory-of-Mind
Rationalizability
Iterated admissibility
Extensive-form rationalizability
delta-rationalizability
Mutual belief in rationality
Experimental game theory
JEL: 
C72
C92
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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