Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266656 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies [ISSN:] 1468-5965 [Volume:] 60 [Issue:] 6 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1684-1700
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
In response to noncompliance with the EU's fundamental values such as democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland, the EU Commission has established the Justice Scoreboard, the Rule of Law Framework and the Rule of Law Mechanism. Moreover, the Commission has proposed linking the disbursement of funds to respect for the rule of law (Rule of Law conditionality). However, the deployment of these measures has not restored compliance. Drawing on the two dominant approaches in compliance studies, the management approach and the enforcement approach, this paper argues that with the exception of Rule of Law conditionality, the Commission's tools are characterized by a mismatch between the causes of the problems identified and the solutions chosen. Instead of sanctioning voluntary noncompliance, they rely on soft measures, which are recommended in cases of involuntary noncompliance, but which are not suitable in cases of deliberate noncompliance.
Subjects: 
rule of law
enforcement
management
EU Commission
noncompliance
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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