Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265941 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9906
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper exploits a 2018 reform of teachers' financial incentives to work in some French disadvantaged schools. Based on this quasi-natural experiment, it evaluates the impact of those incentives on teachers' stated preferences to move to such schools. Using data from the internal human resource management of some educational authority, we find that most responsive teachers have less experience and work already in those areas. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the policy has not hurt other disadvantaged schools, but rather induced some teachers not to remain in their current school or to opt less for regular schools.
Subjects: 
teacher mobility
financial incentives
stated preferences
rank-ordered choices
disadvantaged schools
JEL: 
I21
I22
J45
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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