Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26567
Authors: 
Farvaque, Etienne
Lagadec, Gaël
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2522
Abstract: 
This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], Protection for sale, American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment.
Subjects: 
Lobbies
promises
elections
electoral competition
lies
JEL: 
D72
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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