Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265416 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 22-043
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
When firms are forced to publicly disclose financial information, credit rating agencies are supposed to improve their risk assessments. Theory predicts such an information quality effect but also an adverse reputational concerns effect because credit analysts may become increasingly concerned about alleged rating failures. We empirically examine these predictions using a large scale quasi-natural experiment in Germany, where firms were required to publicly disclose annual financial statements. Consistent with the reputational concern hypothesis, we find an average increase in credit rating downgrades that is entirely driven by changes in the discretionary assessment of the credit analysts rather than changes in firm fundamentals. Analysts tend to give positive private information a lower weight in their risk assessment, while they put a higher weight on negative public information. A last set of results indicate that professional credit providers understand that the resulting downgrades are not warranted, while unsophisticated lenders did indeed reduce the provision of trade credit in response to the rating downgrades.
Subjects: 
Credit Ratings
Disclosure Regulation
Private Firms
Reputational Concerns
JEL: 
G14
G18
G24
M41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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