Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264996 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Finance & Accounting [ISSN:] 1468-5957 [Volume:] 49 [Issue:] 5-6 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 658-689
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a model that links the opacity of an asset to its liquidity. We show that while low‐opacity assets are liquid, intermediate levels of opacity provide incentives for investors to acquire private information, causing adverse selection and illiquidity. High opacity, however, benefits liquidity by reducing the value of a unit of private information. The cross‐section of bid–ask spreads of US firms is shown to be broadly consistent with this hump‐shaped relationship between opacity and illiquidity. Our analysis suggests that uniform disclosure standards may be suboptimal; efficient disclosure can instead be achieved through a two‐tier standard system or by subsidizing voluntary disclosure.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
disclosure requirements
liquidity
opacity
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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