Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26489 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2444
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Over the past two decades, financial market crises with similar features have occurred in different regions of the world. Unstable cross-market linkages during a crisis are referred to as financial contagion. We simulate crisis transmission in the context of a model of market participants adopting various strategies; this allows testing for financial contagion under alternative scenarios. Using a minority game approach, we develop an agent-based multinational model and investigate the reasons for contagion. Although the phenomenon has been extensively investigated in the financial literature, it has not been studied through computational intelligence techniques. Our simulations shed light on parameter values and characteristics which can be exploited to detect contagion at an earlier stage, hence recognising financial crises with the potential to destabilise cross-market linkages. In the real world, such information would be extremely valuable in developing appropriate risk management strategies. - Financial contagion ; minority/majority game ; agent-based model ; evolutionary parameter optimisation
JEL: 
C63
C73
F37
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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