Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26478 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2433
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse how a patent-holding pharmaceutical firm may strategically use advertising of existing drugs to affect R&D investments in new (differentiated) drugs, and thereby affect the probability distribution of future market structures in the industry. Within a fairly general model framework, we derive exact conditions for advertising and R&D being substitute strategies for the incumbent firm and show that it may overinvest in advertising to reduce the incentive for an entrant to invest in R&D, thereby reducing the probability of a new product on the market. In a more specific setting of informative advertising, we show that such overinvestment incentives are always present, and that more generous patent protection implies that a larger share of the patent rent is spent on marketing, relative to R&D.
Schlagwörter: 
Marketing
Research & Development
pharmaceutical
JEL: 
I11
L13
O31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
377.98 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.