Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264473 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Managerial and Decision Economics [ISSN:] 1099-1468 [Volume:] 43 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [Place:] Hoboken, USA [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 791-812
Publisher: 
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Hoboken, USA
Abstract: 
Managerial turnover induces an information loss regarding managers' knowledge about subordinates' abilities that might increase subordinates' incentives to exhibit effort to impress the new manager. To identify how this affects short‐term performance, we analyze within‐season coach turnovers in the German Bundesliga and consider low and high information loss by differentiating between insider and outsider successors. We use a generalized version of the synthetic control method to construct an accurate counterfactual scenario ensuring that results are not simply due to regression‐to‐the‐mean. We find performance improvements for insider and outsider successors, but only outsider successors induce players to exhibit higher effort.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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