Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263683 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9753
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both tasks. Compared to the efficient solution, more employees exert both tasks and effort in the routine task is inefficiently large. As work overload in the routine task is decoupled from a corresponding increase in remuneration, employees perceive a loss of control to allocate effort between the two tasks. Reductions in employees' bargaining power and improvements in monitoring technologies aggravate the issue.
Subjects: 
multi-tasking
work overload
routine tasks
rent extraction
moral hazard
limited liability
Nash Bargaining
JEL: 
D82
D86
J41
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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