Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26295
Authors: 
Jacobs, Bas
Bovenberg, Ary Lans
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2250
Abstract: 
This paper explores how the specification of the earnings function impacts the optimal tax treatment of human capital. If education is complementary to labor effort, education should be subsidized to offset tax distortions on labor supply. However, if most of the education is enjoyed by high ability households, education should be taxed in order to redistribute resources to the poor. The paper identifies the exact conditions under which these two effects cancel and education should be neither taxed nor subsidized. In particular, with non-linear tax instruments, education should be weakly separable from labor and ability in the earnings function. With linear taxes, education should also feature a constant elasticity in a weakly separable earnings function.
Subjects: 
optimal linear and non-linear taxation
optimal education subsidies
human capital
earnings function
JEL: 
H2
H5
I2
J2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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